John McGee v. Township of Conyngham
20-3229
| 3rd Cir. | Sep 23, 2021Background:
- McGee, a Conyngham Township resident and landlord, submitted Pennsylvania Right-to-Know (RTK) requests seeking payroll, time, and expense records for Township Secretary/Supervisor Linda Tarlecki.
- In response, Tarlecki delivered an RTK form to McGee—purportedly from the Township/Authority—requesting his businesses’ tax records and repair receipts; she testified she was "tired" of his requests and did not expect compliance.
- McGee did not respond to the request, did not retain counsel, and alleged the demand was meant to intimidate and silence his criticism of the Board; a reporter who criticized the Board received a similar request.
- McGee sued the Township and three Supervisors under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for First Amendment retaliation and substantive due process violations; the district court granted summary judgment for defendants on the § 1983 claims.
- Afterward, Tarlecki was investigated and charged with stealing township funds; McGee appealed the summary-judgment dismissal of his constitutional claims to the Third Circuit.
- The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal of the substantive due process claim but vacated and remanded the First Amendment retaliation claim for further proceedings.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether McGee suffered a substantive due process deprivation (life, liberty, or property) from the RTK demand | McGee: the demand caused alarm and constituted a constitutionally cognizable deprivation because he reasonably believed it was enforceable | Defendants: no actual loss occurred; momentary alarm is not a protected deprivation; no property interest was infringed | Court: Affirmed summary judgment for defendants; no substantive due process violation |
| Whether the RTK demand constituted retaliatory action sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising First Amendment rights | McGee: the demand targeted his businesses and livelihood and was intended to chill his criticism; causal link exists | Defendants: the demand was unenforceable or de minimis and thus insufficient to chill protected speech | Court: Vacated summary judgment and remanded—viewing facts in McGee’s favor, a reasonable jury could find the demand would deter an ordinary person from speaking |
Key Cases Cited
- Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (substantive due process protects against deliberate deprivations of life, liberty, or property)
- Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650 (summary-judgment review requires viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (standard for summary judgment and evaluation of genuine disputes)
- Thomas v. Indep. Twp., 463 F.3d 285 ( Third Circuit elements for First Amendment retaliation claim )
- Brennan v. Norton, 350 F.3d 399 (retaliatory acts must be more than de minimis to satisfy deterrence element)
- Baloga v. Pittston Area Sch. Dist., 927 F.3d 742 (the threshold for deterrence element is very low)
- Mirabella v. Villard, 853 F.3d 641 (retaliation is an objective inquiry; focus is on whether action would deter an ordinary person)