John Lopez v. State
13-15-00074-CR
| Tex. App. | Sep 15, 2015Background
- Appellant John Lopez had a 10-year suspended sentence for DWI (Cause No. 11-CR-1593-C) and later was convicted and sent to prison on a separate 5-year DWI (Cause No. 11-CR-1390-C). His probation in the first case was later revoked and he was sentenced to seven years.
- At the revocation hearing the trial court took judicial notice of testimony from the prior criminal trial (in which Lopez had been acquitted by a jury) and found by a preponderance that Lopez committed a separate criminal offense in violation of probation.
- The State alleged both technical violations (e.g., fees/costs) and a separate-offense violation; the revocation relied on the separate-offense finding.
- Lopez argued (1) collateral estoppel from his prior acquittal barred use of that testimony to revoke probation, (2) the State had to prove his ability to pay under Art. 42.12 §21(c) because technical violations were alleged, and (3) he was entitled to have time served on the separate prison sentence credited to the revoked-probation sentence.
- The State responded that acquittal does not preclude revocation under the lesser preponderance standard, that Art. 42.12 §21(c) applies only when "only" technical nonpayment violations are alleged, and that concurrent sentences do not entitle a defendant to credit on a separate case unless he was detained on that case (time- credit principles).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Lopez's acquittal collaterally estops the trial court from using prior-trial testimony to revoke probation | Acquittal means the State cannot re‑litigate the same facts; collateral estoppel bars using that testimony to find a probation violation | Acquittal only shows State failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt; revocation uses a lesser preponderance standard so prior acquittal does not bar consideration of the same testimony | Court upheld revocation: acquittal does not bar using prior testimony to find violation by a preponderance of the evidence |
| Whether Art. 42.12 §21(c) required proof of ability to pay | Lopez: because technical violations (fees/costs) were alleged, the State had to prove Lopez was able to pay | State: statute applies only when "only" technical nonpayment violations are alleged; here a separate‑offense violation was also alleged, so proof of ability to pay was not required | Court agreed with State: statute did not apply because a separate‑offense violation was alleged |
| Whether Lopez is entitled to credit on the revoked-probation sentence for time served on the separate concurrent prison sentence | Lopez: time spent in prison on the separate DWI should be credited to the later sentence after revocation | State: concurrent sentencing does not equal interchangeable credit; time credit requires confinement "for the case" seeking credit or a detainer; no record of confinement for the probation case before revocation | Court rejected Lopez's claim: no entitlement to credit absent confinement for that specific case or a detainer |
Key Cases Cited
- Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970) (describing collateral estoppel in criminal cases)
- United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354 (1984) (acquittal does not preclude later civil or administrative proceedings under a lesser standard)
- Murphy v. State, 239 S.W.3d 791 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (framework for determining what issues were necessarily decided for collateral estoppel)
- Russell v. State, 551 S.W.2d 710 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (prior not‑guilty verdict does not bar proving same offense as basis for probation revocation)
- Ex parte Bynum, 772 S.W.2d 113 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (time‑credit entitlement requires detention "for the case" for which credit is sought)