186 So. 3d 429
Miss. Ct. App.2016Background
- Ken and Dee Myrick married in 1981, had three children, and divorced by irreconcilable differences after Dee filed in 2013. A temporary order required Ken to pay Dee $800/month in lieu of the house payment.
- At trial the chancellor awarded Dee the marital home (on 20 acres), an additional 12 acres, her entire 401(k), household items, and assigned her responsibility for the mortgage, taxes, insurance, and repairs.
- The chancellor originally ordered payment of $72,000 at $600/month for ten years (labeled lump-sum) but later amended the judgment converting that to periodic alimony of $600/month with no termination.
- Ken appealed, challenging the property division and the alimony award; both parties filed motions to reconsider and the chancellor corrected clerical errors but changed the alimony form.
- Court of Appeals affirmed the property division as supported by Ferguson factors but held the award of permanent periodic alimony was outside the scope of the parties’ written consent to decide issues in an irreconcilable-differences divorce and thus reversed and remanded on alimony issues.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Ken) | Defendant's Argument (Dee) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Equitable division of marital property | Chancellor’s distribution was inequitable | Division was proper under Ferguson factors | Affirmed — substantial credible evidence supports division |
| Award of periodic alimony when not specified in written consent | Periodic alimony was improper because parties did not consent to alimony issues in their §93-5-2(3) consent | Alimony may be part of property division analysis and properly awarded | Reversed as to periodic alimony — court lacked authority to award periodic alimony not listed in consent |
| Original $72,000 award: lump-sum alimony vs. property division | Lump-sum was excessive or should be vacated | Lump-sum could be part of property settlement and therefore within consent | Remanded for chancellor to clarify whether original $72,000 was intended as lump-sum alimony (improper) or part of property division (may be reinstated) |
| Whether remand or rendition appropriate | Ken sought vacatur/reduction and raised consent issue on appeal | Dee argued award tied to property division and chancellor acted within discretion | Court remanded rather than rendered because ambiguity exists regarding the nature of the original lump-sum award |
Key Cases Cited
- Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So.2d 921 (Miss. 1994) (factors for equitable distribution of marital property)
- Armstrong v. Armstrong, 618 So.2d 1278 (Miss. 1993) (factors for alimony determinations)
- Beezley v. Beezley, 917 So.2d 803 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005) (lump-sum alimony may function as property division)
- Engel v. Engel, 920 So.2d 505 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006) (strict compliance with written-consent requirement for irreconcilable-differences divorce)
- Wideman v. Wideman, 909 So.2d 140 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005) (court limited to issues specifically listed in consent)
- Johnston v. Johnston, 722 So.2d 453 (Miss. 1998) (chancellor’s wide discretion to award lump-sum alimony when equitable distribution and equity-position issues submitted)