John H. Terry v. Leigh Catherall, 337 Ga. App. 902

Plaintiffs John Terry and Karen Correnty own a lower lot and allege defendants (Catherall; Edie and Gillespie Smith) altered their uphill properties so surface water runoff increased and was concentrated onto plaintiffs’ property.
Plaintiffs observed water discharging from pipes and roof areas on defendants’ lots that flowed under boundary fences onto their yard; one witness described flow "like a fire hose" and visible channels where vegetation died.
Plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. James Spotts (soil physics), measured increases in impervious surface on defendants’ lots (Smith ~140% increase; Catherall ~250% increase) and opined those increases raised runoff volume and velocity onto plaintiffs’ property, but he did not quantify flow rates, velocities, or pre-modification drainage patterns.
Defendants moved for summary judgment arguing plaintiffs lacked admissible evidence of causation—specifically no quantifiable velocity/volume or slope measurements to show an artificial increase in runoff.
The trial court granted summary judgment, finding Dr. Spotts’ opinions speculative because they lacked quantifiable data on velocity, volume, and slope; it did not rule on punitive damages, attorney’s fees, or injunctive relief.
The Court of Appeals reversed as to the nuisance claim, holding Dr. Spotts’ testimony was sufficient to create a triable issue on causation and remanded for the trial court to address punitive damages, fees, and injunction issues first.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether defendants artificially increased runoff causing a nuisance	Spotts’ opinion and observations of concentrated flows, visible channels, and increased impervious area create a genuine issue of causation	Expert testimony insufficient—no measurements of flow volume/velocity or slope, so opinion is speculative	Reversed: expert testimony sufficient to create triable issue on causation
Admissibility vs. sufficiency of expert testimony	Expert admissible and can support causation even without precise quantification	Lack of quantification renders opinion speculative and legally insufficient	Court: admissibility not challenged; limited data affects weight, not competence; jury question
Summary judgment standard — sufficiency to deny SJ	Some competent evidence that could support plaintiff’s claim is enough to avoid SJ	SJ proper if no genuine issue of material fact on causation	Court applied standard favoring nonmovant and reversed summary judgment
Remaining remedies (punitive damages, attorney’s fees, permanent injunction)	If causation triable, remedies remain for trial	Relief moot if no liability; defendants did not seek separate rulings	Court remanded for trial court to address these matters in first instance

Rodrigues v. Ga-Pacific Corp., 290 Ga. App. 442 (2008) (summary judgment review construes evidence for nonmovant; need only some competent evidence)
Green v. Eastland Homes, 284 Ga. App. 643 (2007) (lower lot must accept natural runoff but owner who artificially increases/concentrates discharge may be liable)
Sumitomo Corp. of Am. v. Deal, 256 Ga. App. 703 (2002) (landowner may not concentrate or collect water to discharge on lower land in greater quantities or different manner)
Greenwald v. Kersh, 265 Ga. App. 196 (2004) (control over the cause of harm, not ownership, is essential element of nuisance)
Sprayberry Crossing P’ship v. Phenix Supply Co., 274 Ga. App. 364 (2005) (existence of proximate cause is generally a jury question)
Nebo Ventures v. Novapro Risk Solutions, 324 Ga. App. 836 (2013) (appellate courts should not decide issues not ruled on below; trial court should address unresolved issues first)