John H. Quinlan v. Secretary, U.S. Department of Labor
812 F.3d 832
11th Cir.2016Background
- Quinlan Enterprises, a steel-erection subcontractor, was cited by OSHA after an inspector observed two Quinlan workers (foreman Miguel Pacheco and employee Humberto Vargas) on a 15-foot concrete block wall and roof platform without fall protection and using an unsecured stepladder.
- Secretary issued a three-item citation (one item later vacated); ALJ affirmed two items and assessed penalties; Commission remanded for reconsideration after this Court decided ComTran.
- On remand the ALJ found Pacheco and Vargas were Quinlan employees, Pacheco was a supervisor on site, and imputed Pacheco’s knowledge of Vargas’ misconduct to Quinlan; Commission denied discretionary review and adopted the ALJ’s decision.
- Quinlan petitioned for review arguing: (1) the workers were not Quinlan employees at the time; (2) Pacheco was not a supervisor; and (3) ComTran forbids imputing a supervisor’s knowledge when the supervisor is simultaneously engaged in violative conduct.
- The Eleventh Circuit upheld the Commission: substantial evidence supported the Darden-based employer relationship and supervisory status findings, and the court held that imputation of a supervisor’s knowledge of a subordinate’s violation remains proper even when the supervisor is simultaneously participating in the violative conduct.
Issues
| Issue | Quinlan's Argument | Secretary's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Were Pacheco and Vargas Quinlan employees at time of exposure? | Work was directed by general contractor; workers temporarily became Kinney employees. | Darden factors show Quinlan controlled workers; work was within/closely related to Quinlan’s contract. | Held: Substantial evidence supports that both were Quinlan employees under Darden. |
| Was Pacheco a supervisor at time of exposure? | Denies supervisory status. | Evidence showed Pacheco acted as Quinlan’s on-site supervisor. | Held: Commission’s finding that Pacheco was a supervisor is supported by overwhelming evidence. |
| May a supervisor’s knowledge of a subordinate’s violative conduct be imputed when the supervisor is simultaneously engaged in misconduct? | ComTran’s exception should bar imputation because supervisor’s simultaneous misconduct makes imputation unfair; cites L.R. Willson. | The ordinary imputation rule applies where supervisor observed/participated with subordinate; ComTran’s exception concerns only supervisor’s knowledge of his own separate misconduct. | Held: Rejects expansion of ComTran; imputation is proper where supervisor knew of subordinate’s violation even if supervisor participated simultaneously. |
| Did Secretary meet knowledge element for prima facie case? | Argues employer lacked knowledge; imputation improper here. | Secretary proved supervisor’s actual knowledge of subordinate’s violation. | Held: Secretary satisfied knowledge element by proof of supervisor Pacheco’s actual knowledge, imputed to Quinlan. |
Key Cases Cited
- ComTran Grp., Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Labor, 722 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2013) (held supervisor’s knowledge of his own misconduct cannot be automatically imputed to employer)
- Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (U.S. 1992) (control-based test for employer/employee status)
- W.G. Yates & Sons Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 459 F.3d 604 (5th Cir. 2006) (discusses imputation and foreseeability; dicta noted ordinary context for imputation)
- L.R. Willson & Sons, Inc. v. OSHRC, 134 F.3d 1235 (4th Cir. 1998) (reversed imputation where imputation relieved Secretary of proving employer knowledge)
- Floyd S. Pike Elec. Contractor, Inc. v. OSHRC, 576 F.2d 72 (5th Cir. 1978) (employer liability affirmed but did not rely on imputed-knowledge theory)
- Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440 (U.S. 2003) (explains extent-of-control as principal guidepost under Darden)