31 F.4th 638
8th Cir.2022Background
- John Gruttemeyer was a Metro (Transit Authority of the City of Omaha) employee (former bus operator, then fueler/washer); retired from Omaha Fire Dept. on a disability pension for mental-health conditions before working at Metro.
- He served as vice-president of his union (Local 223) from Nov. 2015 to Mar. 1, 2016. Metro terminated him by letter dated July 6, 2016.
- Gruttemeyer sued under the ADA (disability discrimination) and the ADEA (retaliation for opposing age discrimination on behalf of a coworker); parallel state-law claims were coextensive. The Union was dismissed on summary judgment pretrial. He exhausted administrative remedies (NEOC/EEOC).
- At trial a jury found for Gruttemeyer on the ADA claim and on the ADEA retaliation claim, awarding lost-wage and other damages; the district court denied Metro’s JMOL/new-trial motion and awarded attorney’s fees. Metro appealed.
- The Eighth Circuit affirmed: it upheld (1) admission of Gruttemeyer’s treating clinician’s testimony, (2) admission of evidence about interrelated diagnoses, (3) sufficiency of evidence supporting ADA and ADEA verdicts, and (4) the fee award (including fees for administrative work and related claims).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admission of Francene Buda Dardon’s testimony (treating clinician; disclosed as LMHP but later shown to be LIMHP) | Testimony was treating-practitioner testimony (treatment, observation, diagnosis); not expert disclosure requiring retained-expert notice. | Late revelation of LIMHP status was prejudicial surprise and required exclusion or expert disclosure. | Admitted: court did not abuse discretion—treating-practitioner testimony fits Rule 26(a)(2)(C) disclosure scope; no prejudice warranting exclusion. |
| Allowing evidence of major depressive disorder not pled separately (vs. only bipolar disorder in complaint) | Disorders were interrelated and Metro had notice through discovery/depositions; inclusion did not change factual basis. | Plaintiff improperly changed the factual premise of the ADA claim at trial. | Admitted: court did not abuse discretion because evidence showed interrelated diagnoses and pretrial order framed ADA claim broadly. |
| Sufficiency of ADA claim (Metro’s knowledge of disability; disability as a motivating factor for termination) | Evidence showed rumors/animus by coworker with influence (Boncordo), Metro received disability-pension-related paperwork and medical-review/failure-to-work issues; jury could infer Metro knew and disability motivated firing. | Termination was for legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons (policy violations: alleged threat, refusal to sign last-chance agreement, dishonesty at pretermination hearing). | Affirmed: viewing evidence in favor of verdict, reasonable jurors could find Metro knew of disability and that disability was a motivating factor (and that Metro would not have fired him but for that factor). |
| Sufficiency of ADEA retaliation claim (advocacy for coworker as protected activity; but-for causation) | Gruttemeyer opposed Metro’s change of Miller’s hours (a good-faith belief of ADEA violation); his advocacy was protected and temporally linked to termination. | No protected activity or no but-for causal link to termination. | Affirmed: jury could find protected opposition and infer that it was a but-for cause or motivating factor in termination. |
| Attorney’s fees: scope and reasonableness (fees for administrative work; fees for claims against Union; block billing/clerical time) | Fees for administrative NEOC/EEOC work are authorized by ADA; claims against the Union arose from the same core facts so related-fee award appropriate; time entries reasonable. | Fees for administrative proceedings and for work on dismissed Union claims are improper; some entries were block-billed, vague, duplicative, or clerical (should be reduced). | Affirmed: ADA fee statute covers administrative proceedings; district court did not abuse discretion finding claims related and hours reasonable; no reduction warranted on record. |
Key Cases Cited
- Vanderberg v. Petco Animal Supplies Stores, Inc., 906 F.3d 698 (8th Cir. 2018) (treating-healthcare-provider disclosure rules under Rule 26)
- Wegener v. Johnson, 527 F.3d 687 (8th Cir. 2008) (district court discretion in sanctioning Rule 26 noncompliance)
- Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983) (lodestar method for calculating reasonable attorney’s fees)
- Pedigo v. P.A.M. Transp., Inc., 60 F.3d 1300 (8th Cir. 1995) (mixed-motive/motivating-factor standard under ADA)
- Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009) (but-for causation requirement for ADEA claims)
- EEOC v. Lee’s Log Cabin, Inc., 546 F.3d 438 (7th Cir. 2008) (limits on substituting different diagnoses as factual basis for ADA claims)
- Ryan Data Exch., Ltd. v. Graco, Inc., 913 F.3d 726 (8th Cir. 2019) (reductions for block billing and poor recordkeeping)
- Twymon v. Wells Fargo & Co., 462 F.3d 925 (8th Cir. 2006) (policy violation as legitimate non-discriminatory reason)
- Masters v. City of Independence, 998 F.3d 827 (8th Cir. 2021) (standard of review for JMOL denial)
- Brooks v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 620 F.3d 896 (8th Cir. 2010) (treating-physician testimony about causation may trigger expert disclosure)