John Gray v. Commonwealth of Kentucky
534 S.W.3d 211
Ky.2017Background
- John Wesley Gray and Angel Hardy had a three-year relationship that ended after Hardy found evidence of his infidelity; Gray threatened to shoot her and an emergency protective order (EPO) followed.
- One week after the EPO, Gray entered Hardy's home, confronted her 17-year-old son A.H. (and granddaughter T.T.) with a gun, struck A.H., bound A.H. and T.T. with zip ties and duct tape, and bound and struck Hardy; Hardy later persuaded Gray to release them and delayed reporting the incident.
- Gray returned in subsequent days; neighbors called police and Gray was arrested for violating the EPO; Hardy then reported the home invasion and related offenses.
- Gray was indicted on multiple counts including violations of the protective order, kidnapping, first-degree unlawful imprisonment (two counts), first-degree burglary, and being a first-degree persistent felony offender (PFO); a jury convicted him of several counts and recommended a 50-year sentence with the PFO enhancement.
- On appeal Gray argued (1) the trial court erred by admitting evidence of his prior threat (other-acts evidence) and (2) the court should have directed acquittal on the first-degree unlawful imprisonment counts for A.H. and T.T.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Commonwealth) | Defendant's Argument (Gray) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of prior threat under KRE 404(b) / 404(b)(2) and KRE 403 balancing | Threat was probative to explain issuance of the EPO and why Hardy delayed reporting; it was inextricably intertwined with the crimes | Threat evidence was only prejudicial character evidence and added nothing material because jury already knew an EPO existed | Admission was within trial court discretion: threat was relevant and probative; prejudice did not substantially outweigh probative value; no abuse of discretion |
| Prejudicial testimony that Gray "had a violent history" — whether mistrial required | The comment was inadvertent and curable by an admonition; not so inflammatory to require mistrial | The statement suggested a pattern of violence making a jury mistrial necessary despite admonition | Admonition was adequate; mistrial denial not an abuse of discretion |
| Sufficiency of evidence / directed verdict on first-degree unlawful imprisonment for A.H. and T.T. | Evidence supported at least second-degree unlawful imprisonment and kidnapping; jury could reasonably find exposure to risk of serious physical injury | Commonwealth failed to prove risk-of-serious-physical-injury element required for first-degree unlawful imprisonment; directed verdict should have been granted | Gray did not preserve instruction challenge; directed-verdict/palpable-error review unavailable; not entitled to acquittal |
| Availability of palpable-error review for unpreserved jury-instruction claims | N/A (Commonwealth argues procedural bar) | Seeks palpable-error review to challenge instruction on first-degree unlawful imprisonment | RCr 9.54(2) bars palpable-error review of unpreserved instruction claims; issue not reviewable on that basis |
Key Cases Cited
- Matthews v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 11 (Ky. 2005) (standard: admission of other‑acts evidence reviewed for abuse of discretion)
- Bell v. Commonwealth, 875 S.W.2d 882 (Ky. 1994) (other‑acts admissible if relevant and probative value outweighs prejudice)
- Clark v. Commonwealth, 267 S.W.3d 668 (Ky. 2008) (evidence inextricably intertwined when context explains victim’s delay in reporting)
- Campbell v. Commonwealth, 564 S.W.2d 528 (Ky. 1978) (directed verdict proper only when no reasonable jury could convict on any theory)
- Martin v. Commonwealth, 409 S.W.3d 340 (Ky. 2013) (RCr 9.54(2) bars palpable‑error review of unpreserved instruction claims)