886 F.3d 700
8th Cir.2018Background
- In 2003 the U.S. sought John Graham’s extradition from Canada on a federal premeditated murder charge; Canada extradited him and later Canadian courts affirmed extradition.
- The federal premeditated murder indictment was dismissed because Graham is a Canadian Indian and the indictment did not allege that status; he remained in South Dakota custody.
- In 2009 a South Dakota grand jury indicted Graham for premeditated murder and felony murder (predicate felony: kidnapping); the U.S. requested and obtained from Canada a formal Consent to Waiver of Specialty permitting prosecution of the offenses listed in the state indictment, including felony murder.
- At trial the jury acquitted Graham of premeditated murder but convicted him of felony murder; he was sentenced to life in prison.
- Graham sought post-conviction relief arguing (1) the waiver did not authorize felony murder because felony murder is not a crime in Canada (dual criminality), and (2) the state court lacked jurisdiction under the Treaty’s specialty rule; state courts rejected his claims and he filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
- The district court denied relief but granted a certificate of appealability on the dual criminality claim; the Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding the Canadian Consent to Waiver of Specialty conclusively established compliance with the Treaty’s dual-criminality requirement.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Graham can challenge prosecution for felony murder under the Treaty’s dual criminality requirement | Graham: Felony murder is not a crime in Canada, so Article 2 dual criminality was not satisfied and prosecution lacked jurisdiction | State/US: Canada’s consent to waive specialty and its determination that the conduct satisfied Article 2 precludes U.S. court review; deference to extraditing country is required | Held: Graham cannot collaterally attack Canada’s determination; the Canadian Consent to Waiver of Specialty conclusively established dual criminality and forecloses relief |
| Whether the rule of specialty barred prosecution for felony murder | Graham: Felony murder is a different offense than the one for which extradition was granted, so specialty bars prosecution | State: Canada expressly consented to waiver of specialty for the state charges | Held: Waiver of specialty by Canada defeats Graham’s specialty argument; state supreme court properly rejected it |
| Whether Graham has standing/statutory zone-of-interests to raise Treaty-based claims in federal court | Graham: He is in custody and claims treaty violation of his rights | State: Argued district court erred in concluding Graham had standing to litigate the Treaty issue | Held: Graham has Article III standing; the question is one of whether his claim falls within the treaty’s zone of interests (a merits inquiry), not jurisdiction |
| Whether U.S. courts may review the extraditing state’s interpretation of its own law in assessing dual criminality | Graham: U.S. courts should decide whether felony murder exists in Canada | State/US: Such review would infringe the act-of-state principle and international comity; the extraditing country’s decision is dispositive | Held: U.S. courts will not sit in judgment of Canada’s interpretation; deference applies and the Minister’s consent is conclusive |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (discusses rule of specialty and enforceability of treaty rights in U.S. courts)
- Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (statutory standing / zone-of-interests test explanation)
- United States v. Campbell, 300 F.3d 202 (2d Cir.) (deference to extraditing country’s determination on extradition scope and dual criminality)
- United States v. Lomeli, 596 F.3d 496 (8th Cir.) (extradited individual may raise objections the surrendering state would consider a treaty breach)
- United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992) (discussion indicating specialty may be raised absent a protest by the surrendering state)
