John Does v. Richard Snyder, 834 F.3d 696

Background

Michigan’s Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) began as a non-public registry (1994) and was expanded over time to include public online disclosure, tier classifications (2011), in-person lifetime reporting for Tier III, and 1,000-foot school-zone restrictions (2006).
The 2006 and 2011 amendments were applied retroactively to persons who had been convicted before those amendments.
Plaintiffs are six registrants (five John Does, one Mary Doe), all Tier III, who challenged multiple SORA provisions as vague, overbroad, punitive, violating free speech and due process, and violating the Ex Post Facto Clause when applied retroactively.
The district court: rejected the Ex Post Facto challenge and most due process claims, but found certain SORA provisions unconstitutionally vague, barred strict liability, and struck the lifetime online-alias registration under the First Amendment.
On appeal the Sixth Circuit analyzed whether SORA is civil or punitive under the Smith v. Doe test and related precedents and concluded the retroactive application of the 2006 and 2011 amendments is unconstitutional as Ex Post Facto punishment.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether retroactive application of SORA amendments constitutes punishment in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause	Retroactive amendments impose punitive burdens (geographic bans, lifetime in-person reporting, public shaming, tiering without individualized assessment) and thus are retroactive punishment	SORA is a civil, regulatory scheme intended to protect public safety; restrictions are minor/indirect and similar to Alaska’s registry upheld in Smith v. Doe	Held: Retroactive application of 2006 and 2011 amendments is punitive and violates the Ex Post Facto Clause; those provisions cannot be applied to plaintiffs
Whether SORA’s stated legislative intent shows punitive purpose	Plaintiffs point to punitive effects (criminal-style sanctions, registration recorded on judgment, handled by police) to infer punitive purpose	Michigan points to SORA’s explicit police-power safety purpose and lack of express punitive intent	Held: Legislative intent is non-punitive on its face; court applied effects test (Smith) and found the effects punitive despite stated intent
Whether SORA’s restrictions are excessive or irrationally related to a non-punitive purpose	Plaintiffs argue restrictions are excessive, lack individualized dangerousness assessment, and have little empirical support for reducing recidivism	Michigan argues restrictions are rationally related to public safety and preventing reoffending	Held: The court found scant evidence SORA advances its stated public-safety goals and that the restrictions are excessive, weighing toward punitive characterization
Whether SORA’s burdens (e.g., residence/work/school-zone limits, lifetime in-person reporting) amount to affirmative disabilities or restraints comparable to criminal punishment	Plaintiffs argue these restraints are substantial (housing, employment, family separation, in-person reporting backed by criminal penalties)	Michigan argues restraints are non-physical and less severe than traditional disabilities previously held non-punitive	Held: Court found the restraints significant and unlike the Alaska scheme in Smith, supporting the conclusion that SORA’s effects are punitive

Key Cases Cited

Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (discusses historical scope of Ex Post Facto prohibition)
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87 (describes Framers’ concern about retroactive punishment)
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (guideposts for distinguishing civil regulation from punishment)
Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (effects, not form, determine Ex Post Facto character)
Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (two-part test: legislative intent and whether effects are punitive)
United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267 (discusses civil/remedial vs punitive measures)
McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24 (context on sex-offender dangerousness statements)
De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (examples of occupational restrictions treated as non-punitive)
Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (upholding professional disqualification)
Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (discussion about reconsidering civil/criminal distinction)