John Does 1-4 v. Snyder
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36699
E.D. Mich.2013Background
- Plaintiffs challenge SORA as amended in 2011, seeking declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against Governor Snyder and Col. Etue.
- SORA 2011 reclassifies registrants into three tiers, extends life-long registration for Tier III, and expands reporting and loitering restrictions.
- Plaintiffs are Michigan residents classified as Tier III offenders or affected by HYTA dispositions.
- Plaintiffs allege retroactive application, burdens on travel and occupations, and infringements of First Amendment and parental rights, among others.
- Defendants move to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6); the court grants in part and denies in part the amended motion.
- The court dismisses Counts I, II, III (retroactive aspects) and VIII (Headlee) with prejudice/without prejudice as specified, denies others, and leaves Counts IV–VII under consideration.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ex Post Facto applicability to 2011 SORA | Doe argued retroactive punishment. | SORA is civil, not punitive. | SORA 2011 is regulatory, not criminal; Count I dismissed. |
| Fundamental rights under substantive due process | SORA infringes travel, occupation, and parental rights. | Statute serves public safety; narrowly tailored. | Right to travel and right to engage in common occupations are not violated; Count IV granted for potential loitering impact. |
| Retroactivity effects on Doe I and Doe II | Retroactive extension of HYTA and non-sex offense applicability violates due process. | Retroactivity justified by public safety and rational basis. | Retroactive application to Doe I and II dismissed; retroactive extension to life remains potentially viable. |
| Vagueness, impossibility, and strict liability | Some reporting requirements are vague and impose strict liability. | Provisions have long been in effect; not strictly liable. | Plaintiffs pled a plausible due process claim; dismissal not appropriate at this stage. |
| First Amendment challenges to online account reporting | Online identifiers reporting chills speech; overbroad regulation possible. | Content-neutral regulation with narrow tailoring; need more record on operation. | Pleading sufficient to show plausible First Amendment claim; dismissal denied for now. |
Key Cases Cited
- Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) (ex post facto analysis for sex-offender registry; civil intent examined via Kennedy factors)
- Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963) (seven-factor punitive/exemption framework for ex post facto)
- Doe v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 490 F.3d 491 (6th Cir. 2007) (Doe as controlling on procedural due process limits for public disclosure)
- Lanni v. Engler, 994 F. Supp. 849 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (prior versions of SORA considered nonpunitive; legislative intent civil)
- Akella v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 67 F. Supp. 2d 716 (E.D. Mich. 1999) (discussed in ex post facto context for SORA)
- Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997) (occupational debarment as non-punitive restraint)
- Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (travel burden analysis in right-to-travel context)
- Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 310 F.3d 484 (6th Cir. 2002) (local intrastate travel rights; access-focused)
- Doe v. Nebraska, 734 F. Supp. 2d 882 (D. Neb. 2010) (First Amendment considerations for online-identifiers reporting)