John Doe XLVI v. Stephanie Anderson
108 A.3d 378
Me.2015Background
- John Doe XLVI appeals a superior court decision denying declaratory relief and a TRO regarding SORNA as applied to him.
- Doe pleaded guilty in 2003 to possession of sexually explicit material (Class D) and was sentenced to 364 days’ imprisonment with probation; SORNA was part of sentencing at that time.
- Initially, Maine law required sentencing courts to order compliance with SORNA for sex offenses; later amendments shifted the triggering event to notification rather than a sentencing directive.
- In 2003, possession of sexually explicit material was added to the list of offenses requiring SORNA registration; in 2004, SORNA registration was removed from sentencing and would be triggered by notice.
- Doe received a 2006 notice to register and challenged the duty as unconstitutional; 2009 amendments clarified that registration is triggered by notice, not court order.
- Doe petitioned for declaratory relief and TRO in 2012; the trial court rejected his ex post facto claim and other constitutional challenges, leading to this appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is SORNA punitive under the Bill of Attainder? | Doe contends retroactive registration constitutes punishment. | Anderson argues SORNA is civil and serves public safety. | Retroactive SORNA registration is punitive in effect. |
| Does the lack of a judicial trial in imposing SORNA requirements violate the Bill of Attainder? | Applying SORNA without judicial determination harms process. | Legislature may assign regulatory consequences without trial when civil in nature. | Imposition occurred without a judicial trial; remand on specificity (see below). |
| Is there specific targeting (specificity) to a particular individual or group under the Bill of Attainder? | Amendment may target individuals based on past conduct. | No targeted punishment shown; broad application to offenses. | Record insufficient on specificity; remand for further factual development. |
Key Cases Cited
- DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Exec. Dir., Me. Revenue Servs., 922 A.2d 465 (2007 ME 62) (punishment analysis under Bill of Attainder and ex post facto contexts)
- United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946) (historical view of punishment in Bill of Attainder analysis)
- Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977) (intent-effects framework for punishment)
- State v. Haskell, 2001 ME 154 (2001) ( Mendoza-Martinez factors and punishment framework in Maine)
- Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963) (seven Mendoza-Martinez factors for punishment analysis)
- Letalien, 2009 ME 130 (2009) (retroactive application of enhanced SORNA punished under Mendoza-Martinez factors)
- Williams, 2013 ME 24 (2013) (distinguishes pre- and post-enactment application of SORNA for punishment analysis)
- Doe v. Williams, 61 A.3d 718 (2013) (See Williams (Me. Supreme Court) discussion of Mendoza-Martinez factors)
- Roe v. Farwell, 999 F. Supp. 174 (D. Mass. 1998) (specicity and punitive effect concerns in Bill of Attainder context)
- Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) (categorical judgments and regulatory consequences in Bill of Attainder contexts)