John Doe v. University of Southern Indiana, 43 F.4th 784

Background

John Doe and Jane Doe were friends; after a night of drinking on Nov. 13–14, 2020, Jane later alleged John touched her breasts and digitally penetrated her without consent; Jane was very intoxicated and initially did not report non-consent.
Jane disclosed the incident to peers in February 2021 and filed a Title IX complaint on Feb. 25; John received notice March 26 and was entitled to an advisor.
The university engaged independent outside contractors: an outside investigator, a three-member hearing panel (two lawyers and an educator), and an outside appeal officer.
At the August 2021 hearing (video), witnesses testified; John changed his story—he denied the night’s sexual contact but admitted to a prior consensual digital penetration a week earlier.
The panel found John responsible by a preponderance of the evidence, imposed a three-semester suspension, and the appeal officer affirmed; John sued under Title IX and sought a preliminary injunction to block the suspension.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of injunctive relief, holding John failed to show a likelihood of success on his Title IX sex-discrimination claim after reviewing public-pressure evidence, alleged procedural irregularities, and the weight of the evidence.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Preliminary injunction standard / likelihood of success	John argued the record shows likely success on Title IX sex-discrimination claim and thus injunctive relief is warranted.	University argued John cannot show he is likely to succeed on the merits; ordinary procedural imperfections do not establish sex bias.	Court held John failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits; denial of preliminary injunction affirmed.
Public pressure as evidence of sex bias	John pointed to social media, petition, and university statements as evidence the school had motive to be anti-male.	University emphasized use of independent outside investigators and decisionmakers insulated process from campus pressure.	Court held public pressure alone was insufficient and was weakened here because outside contractors conducted the investigation, hearing, and appeal.
Procedural irregularities in the grievance process	John identified a list of alleged procedural errors (12), arguing they cumulatively show gender bias.	University argued many alleged errors were non-errors, invited by John, applied equally to both parties, or immaterial.	Court held the errors were fewer/less serious than in precedent (e.g., Purdue) and did not make it likely John could prove sex discrimination.
Weight of the evidence / credibility findings	John argued the panel’s decision was against the weight of the evidence and could only be explained by anti-male bias.	University argued the panel reasonably judged credibility, noting corroboration and problematic shifts in John’s account.	Court held credibility determinations were within the panel’s discretion; the outcome was not so lopsided as to infer sex bias.

Key Cases Cited

Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 555 U.S. 7 (2008) (preliminary-injunction standard requires likelihood of success on the merits)
Mays v. Dart, 974 F.3d 810 (7th Cir. 2020) (likelihood-of-success threshold for preliminary injunction)
Doe v. Purdue University, 928 F.3d 652 (7th Cir. 2019) (procedural slant in Title IX process can support inference of sex bias)
Doe v. Columbia University, 831 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 2016) (lopsided outcomes may permit inference of evaluator bias)
Doe v. Columbia College Chicago, 933 F.3d 849 (7th Cir. 2019) (elements of Title IX sex-discrimination claim)
Schwake v. Arizona Board of Regents, 967 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 2020) (public pressure and procedural defects in Title IX processes)
Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575 (6th Cir. 2018) (external pressure context in campus sexual-misconduct adjudications)
Menaker v. Hofstra University, 935 F.3d 20 (2d Cir. 2019) (procedural failings that can support Title IX claim)
Doe v. Samford University, 29 F.4th 675 (11th Cir. 2022) (deviation from policy is not by itself Title IX discrimination)
Doe v. University of Denver, 1 F.4th 822 (10th Cir. 2021) (limits on inferring anti-male bias from anti-respondent procedures)