974 F.3d 858
8th Cir.2020Background
- John Doe (pseudonym) was accused by Jane Roe of sexual assault after a consensual-seeming encounter on Oct. 29, 2017; Roe later reported memory gaps and alleged incapacitation.
- The University’s Title IX coordinator (Farrar) investigated, found sexual contact but concluded Roe was not incapacitated and that Doe had no reason to know otherwise.
- Roe appealed; a three-person hearing panel conducted a de novo review, credited Roe’s uncertainty about consent, found Doe "responsible" by a 2–1 vote, and imposed modest sanctions (training, community service, online course); Doe was allowed to graduate.
- Doe alleged the panel’s finding was against the weight of the evidence and that the University, under external pressure (OCR inquiry, legislature, media, campus protests), discriminated against him because he is male; he sued under Title IX and § 1983 (Due Process), naming officials and the Board.
- The district court dismissed all claims. The Eighth Circuit reversed as to the Title IX claim (plausible discrimination claim) and affirmed dismissal of the Due Process / § 1983 claims; the case was remanded for further proceedings on Title IX only.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Title IX discrimination | University disciplined Doe because he is male; panel decision against weight of evidence, atypical sanctions, and campus/OCR pressure support inference of sex bias | Decision reflected credibility findings and process, not sex-based discrimination; complaint fails to plead sex-based motive | Title IX claim plausibly pleaded; reversed on Title IX and remanded for discovery |
| Notice of charge (Due Process) | Panel adjudicated a "force/no-consent" theory without adequate notice | Roe raised consent/force issues on appeal, so Doe had reasonable notice of the theory | Notice adequate; no due process violation pleaded |
| Burden/standard of proof (Due Process) | Panel shifted burden to Doe or used an improper standard; preponderance inadequate | Policy presumes not responsible; preponderance is constitutionally permissible | No due process violation; preponderance is acceptable |
| Cross-examination / witness process (Due Process) | Denied the right to personally cross-examine; panel refused key questions and to interview proposed witnesses | Panel used submitted questions and exercised discretion; no concrete allegation of specific excluded material questions or witness testimony | Dismissed for failure to plead specific material deprivation; panel questioning procedure not categorically unconstitutional |
| Failure to train / § 1983 official/individual claims | Officials and University failed to train and deprived Doe of due process | Without an underlying constitutional violation, failure-to-train and individual claims fail | § 1983 due process claims dismissed; failure-to-train claim fails at pleading stage |
Key Cases Cited
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (pleading standard for plausibility)
- Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (due-process balancing test)
- Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 415 F.2d 1077 (notice requirement in university discipline)
- Navato v. Sletten, 560 F.2d 340 (notice may come from complainant's pleadings)
- Doe v. Purdue University, 928 F.3d 652 (Title IX bias-inference analysis)
- Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575 (review of university process and bias inference)
- Doe v. Columbia University, 831 F.3d 46 (weight of evidence and inference of bias)
- Haidak v. Univ. of Massachusetts-Amherst, 933 F.3d 56 (panel-questioning procedure and cross-examination limits)
- Lavine v. Milne, 424 U.S. 577 (discussion of burdens of persuasion in constitutional context)