John Doe v. Univ. of Cincinnati
872 F.3d 393
6th Cir.2017Background
- John Doe (graduate student) and Jane Roe (undergraduate) had a sexual encounter; Roe later reported it as nonconsensual to the University of Cincinnati (UC) Title IX Office.
- UC investigated, prepared a Title IX report summarizing statements by Roe, Doe, and four witnesses (all hearsay), but Roe did not appear at the Administrative Review Committee (ARC) hearing. Doe was not told in advance that Roe would be absent.
- At the ARC hearing the Chair read Roe’s interview and closing statement into the record, the panel asked no questions of Roe, and Doe was given limited opportunity to respond; the panel found Doe responsible and recommended a two-year suspension (reduced on appeal to one year).
- Doe sued in federal district court alleging deprivation of due process (right to confront accuser) and sought a preliminary injunction to enjoin the suspension; the district court granted the injunction.
- The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that where a disciplinary case turns on competing credibility and the university relies solely on the accuser’s out-of-court statements, due process requires a means for the factfinder to assess the accuser’s credibility (e.g., questioning through the panel or live/virtual participation).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether due process required an opportunity to confront and question the accuser when she did not appear | Doe: UC violated due process by deciding credibility disputes based only on Roe’s hearsay statements without any form of confrontation | UC: Doe had opportunity to be heard; written questions and summaries sufficed; cannot compel witnesses to appear; hearsay use is permissible | Held: When case is a pure he-said/she-said credibility contest and university relies solely on accuser’s out-of-court statements, some method for the factfinder to assess accuser’s credibility is required (e.g., questioning through panel or live/remote testimony) |
| Whether admission/use of hearsay alone automatically violates due process | Doe: Hearsay deprived him of ability to test Roe’s prior statements and credibility | UC: Use of hearsay is allowed in disciplinary settings; hearsay alone does not trigger confrontation right | Held: Use of hearsay does not per se trigger confrontation rights; but when the outcome depends entirely on the accuser’s testimonial statements (no corroboration), the right to test credibility becomes essential |
| Whether preliminary injunction was appropriate pending merits | Doe: Absent injunction, suspension and reputational harm would be irreparable; strong likelihood of success on due process claim | UC: Enforcement and integrity of disciplinary system and Title IX enforcement weigh against injunction | Held: Preliminary injunction proper—Doe showed likely success on merits, irreparable harm, and neutral/limited public-interest harm |
Key Cases Cited
- Flaim v. Med. Coll. of Ohio, 418 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2005) (cross-examination may be essential when case turns on credibility)
- Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (due process balancing test)
- Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (right to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner)
- Cummins v. Univ. of Cincinnati, [citation="662 F. App'x 437"] (6th Cir. 2016) (upholding UC’s preapproved written-question procedure when accuser appears)
- Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990) (demeanor and cross-examination critical to credibility; virtual testimony can sometimes suffice)
- Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974) (cross-examination to expose biases and test perceptions)
- Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895) (importance of observing witness demeanor in assessing credibility)
- Plummer v. Univ. of Houston, 860 F.3d 767 (5th Cir. 2017) (cross-examination not required where case did not rely on complainant’s testimonial evidence)