John Doe v. United States, 853 F.3d 792

Doe sues the United States in the Southern District of Texas, alleging Fifth Amendment due process violation for being accused in Roe’s criminal proceeding without a public vindication forum.
The district court dismissed on limitations grounds, ruling 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) six-year bar applied to statements from 2008 and did not toll for 2012 sentencing remarks.
Roe pleaded guilty in 2008 to conspiracy counts related to a kickback scheme; the Information described the Consultant and projects with details Doe argues identify him.
During Roe’s plea and sentencing, the Government described the Consultant and noted ongoing investigation; Doe contends these details identified him and harmed his reputation.
Doe argues the 2012 sentencing references, though less specific, renewed interest and caused ongoing harm; he sought expungement and related relief.
The district court dismissed with prejudice, and Doe appealed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether sovereign immunity bars Doe's suit	Doe argues § 702 waives immunity for equitable relief against the agency.	Government argues no agency action under § 551(13) occurred, so § 702 does not waive immunity.	Sovereign immunity not barred; subject matter jurisdiction questioned but § 702 may apply.
Whether the claim accrues in 2008 or later	Doe contends accrual deferred until vindication opportunities existed or indictment threatened.	Accrual occurred when Doe was named in the information and public records 2008.	accrual occurred in 2008; limitations bar 2008 and 2012 statements.
Whether equitable tolling applies to the continuous-violation theory	Doe seeks tolling until he could contest the allegations; continuing violation doctrine should apply.	Doctrine is inapplicable for discrete actions; tolling limited.	Continuing violation tolling does not apply; claims barred.
Whether 2012 sentencing references violate due process independently of 2008 statements	Doe contends 2012 references, though minimal, still identifiable and harmful.	2012 references are non-identifying and do not violate due process.	2012 references do not, standing alone, violate due process.
Whether leave to amend would be futile	Doe seeks to articulate more specific tolling arguments.	Amendment would be futile given prior rulings and accrual.	Amendment denied as futile.

Briggs, 514 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1975) (expungement-like relief against government not barred by sovereign immunity in Briggs)
Holy Land Found. for Relief & Development v. United States, 624 F.3d 685 (5th Cir. 2010) (agency action, sanctions, and relief concepts in § 702 context)
In re Smith, 656 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. Unit A Sept. 1981) (expungement and due process vindication in Fifth Circuit context)
Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (§ 702 waiver of sovereign immunity beyond 'agency action' limits)
Alabama–Coushatta Tribe of Tex. v. United States, 757 F.3d 484 (5th Cir. 2014) (agency action and sovereign immunity scope in § 702 analysis)
Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007) (accrual standard: right of action first accrues when plaintiff can sue for relief)