John Doe v. State of Florida
217 So. 3d 1020
Fla.2017Background
- Fifteen petitioners challenged a county judge’s unilateral email announcing Baker Act hearings would be conducted remotely via Polycom, without notice or formal administrative order.
- Petitioners objected to videoconferenced judicial presences for involuntary inpatient placement hearings under Fla. Stat. § 394.467.
- The Second District held that a judge’s choice to preside remotely is within judicial discretion and no ministerial duty requires in-person presence.
- The Florida Supreme Court reviewed, quashed the Second District, and held judicial officers must be physically present at Baker Act hearings absent patient/party consent.
- The Court reasoned from the Baker Act’s protections, constitutional due-process principles for commitment hearings, Rule of Judicial Administration 2.530(d)(1), and prior warnings about videoconferencing’s harms to vulnerable patients.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a judicial officer must be physically present at Baker Act commitment hearings | Petitioners: judges must be physically present; remote presiding violates due process and statute’s requirement to hold hearings "in the county or the facility" and in settings not injurious to patients | State/Trial judge: remote presiding via videoconference is within judicial discretion; statute does not explicitly require physical presence | Held: Judicial officer must be physically present absent consent; physical presence is part of ministerial duty to preside over such hearings |
| Whether testimony/presiding via communication equipment is permitted without party consent under Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.530 | Petitioners: Rule 2.530(d)(1) disallows taking testimony through communication equipment without all parties’ consent | State: rule does not bar a judge from presiding remotely so long as participants are physically co-located at the facility | Held: Rule 2.530(d)(1) supports that testimony/judicial presence via communication equipment requires party consent or other rule authorization; remote presiding without consent is impermissible |
| Whether administrative adoption/notice required to implement remote procedures | Petitioners: ad hoc email policy was procedurally improper; technology use should be by administrative order and subject to review | Defense/Amici favoring remote use: videoconference pilot programs provide efficiency and cost savings | Held: Important procedural changes affecting vulnerable persons require formal orders/policy, not informal email proclamations; implementation should follow formal administrative process |
| Whether videoconference use is appropriate for vulnerable populations (Baker Act patients) | Petitioners/Disability Rights FL: video can depersonalize proceedings, confuse or exacerbate patients’ conditions, undermine fairness and rehabilitation | State/Amici: improvements in technology and other jurisdictions’ practices show video can be effective and efficient | Held: Court emphasized risks to vulnerable patients, cited prior studies and recommendations against video for involuntary placement; physical presence better protects due process and patient well-being |
Key Cases Cited
- Brown v. State, 538 So.2d 833 (Fla. 1989) (judge’s presence at trial is a fundamental right)
- Jordan v. State, 597 So.2d 352 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (due process required for commitment)
- O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (U.S. 1975) (commitment requires due process)
- Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (U.S. 1972) (commitment implicates massive curtailment of liberty requiring protections)
- Mouliom v. Ne. Fla. State Hosp., 128 So.3d 979 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (right to be present at involuntary commitment hearing; waiver must be knowing)
- Ibur v. State, 765 So.2d 275 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (commitment requires right to counsel, to be present, and other due process protections)
- Shuman v. State, 358 So.2d 1333 (Fla. 1978) (commitment persons entitled to constitutional protections)