John Doe v. State of South Carolina
25-1787
| 4th Cir. | Aug 15, 2025Background
- South Carolina enacted a budget proviso barring transgender students from using multi-stall restrooms matching their gender identity in public schools, defining sex by birth anatomy/genetics and penalizing non-compliant schools financially.
- "John Doe," a transgender high school student, was disciplined and eventually withdrew from in-person school rather than comply; his performance and well-being suffered online.
- Doe and family sought re-enrollment and challenged the law, alleging Title IX and Equal Protection violations under Fourth Circuit precedent (Grimm).
- The district court stayed the case pending Supreme Court action on a related case (West Virginia v. B.P.J.) and denied Doe's motions for injunctive relief without prejudice.
- Doe appealed, seeking an injunction pending appeal, arguing the stay functionally denied urgent relief as the new school year began.
- The Fourth Circuit considered jurisdiction, standing, and merits of preliminary relief amid ongoing uncertainty about forthcoming Supreme Court rulings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the court has jurisdiction to review the preliminary injunction denial and stay order | Denial/stay effectively refused needed urgent relief; merits reached | Denial/stay was without prejudice; no final appealable order | Jurisdiction upheld: effect was constructive denial |
| Whether Doe has standing to challenge the Proviso and appeal | Proviso harms are concrete, ongoing, and redressable | Standing lacking due to change in Proviso, procedural flaws | Standing found; Doe aggrieved by district court order |
| Whether an injunction pending appeal is warranted (Title IX/Equal Protection) | Grimm controls; Proviso likely violates Doe's rights | Grimm is unsettled; Proviso is materially different, SCOTUS pending | Injunction granted under binding circuit precedent |
| Whether appeal should be expedited | Urgency due to school year, ongoing harm | Normal timeline sufficient, injunction gives interim relief | Expedited appeal denied; normal schedule remains |
Key Cases Cited
- Grimm v. Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd., 972 F.3d 586 (4th Cir. 2020) (holding bathroom policy requiring students to use facilities matching biological sex violated Equal Protection and Title IX)
- Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008) (establishes four-factor test for preliminary injunctions)
- Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (2009) (clarifies the two most critical injunction factors: likelihood of success and irreparable harm)
- Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (sets standing requirements: injury in fact, traceability, redressability)
- Carson v. Am. Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79 (1981) (defines interlocutory appeal rights under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1))
- Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330 (2016) (explains standards for injury under Article III standing)
