John Doe v. San Diego Unified School District
21-56259
| 9th Cir. | Dec 4, 2021Background
- Plaintiffs: a 16‑year‑old student (Jill Doe) and her parents sought an injunction pending appeal to block San Diego Unified School District’s COVID‑19 student vaccine mandate.
- SDUSD mandate: students 16+ must be fully vaccinated to attend in‑person or participate in extracurriculars unless they obtain a medical exemption, qualify for temporary "conditional enrollment" (certain newly enrolling categories), or are covered by procedural IEP protections; no religious exemption for students.
- The motions panel had earlier granted a limited injunction tied to the availability of a prior "per se" pregnancy deferral; SDUSD removed that pregnancy deferral, and the panel concluded the injunction terminated under its own terms.
- Plaintiffs allege Free Exercise Clause violations (facial and as‑applied), arguing religious objections to vaccination and disparate treatment because secular exemptions (medical, conditional enrollment, IEP procedures) are permitted while religious exemptions are not.
- The motions panel evaluated a preliminary‑injunction standard (likelihood of success, irreparable harm, balance of equities, public interest) and applied Smith/Lukumi frameworks to decide whether strict scrutiny or rational‑basis review governs.
- Holding (motions panel): plaintiffs failed to raise serious questions on neutrality/general applicability; rational‑basis review applies; plaintiffs did not show likely success, irreparable harm, or that the public interest favored an injunction — motion denied. Judge Ikuta dissented, arguing strict scrutiny should apply and an injunction should issue.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the injunction pending appeal should continue after SDUSD removed the pregnancy deferral | Injunction should remain to prevent enforcement of the mandate against Doe | The earlier injunction was expressly limited to the period the pregnancy deferral existed; removal terminates the injunction | Injunction terminated under its own terms once SDUSD removed the pregnancy deferral |
| Proper scrutiny for Free Exercise challenge (neutrality/general applicability) | Medical exemptions, conditional enrollment, and IEP procedures treat comparable secular activity more favorably, so strict scrutiny applies (Tandon) | The mandate is facially neutral and generally applicable; exemptions are narrow, time‑limited, and serve health reasons, so rational‑basis review applies (Smith) | Motions panel: plaintiffs failed to raise serious questions that the mandate is nonneutral or not generally applicable; rational‑basis review applied |
| Whether medical exemptions, conditional enrollment, or IEP protections are "comparable" secular activities that undermine general applicability | In‑person attendance by medically exempt or conditionally enrolled students poses the same transmission risk as religiously unvaccinated students, so differential treatment is unconstitutional | Medical exemptions are tightly limited by CDC/manufacturer contraindications and typically time‑limited; conditional enrollment is a temporary grace for documentation; IEP protections are federally mandated and procedural, not exemptions | Court: those provisions are not comparable in scope/risk to a broad religious exemption and do not show individualized, discretionary exceptions that would trigger strict scrutiny |
| Preliminary‑injunction factors: likelihood of success, irreparable harm, public interest | Doe will face irreparable First Amendment injury by losing in‑person education and extracurriculars (including athletic opportunities); serious questions on merits exist | Plaintiffs have not shown likelihood of success; remote alternative exists; irreparable injury claims are speculative and public health favors vaccination mandate | Motions panel: plaintiffs failed to show likelihood of success or irreparable harm; public interest favors SDUSD’s mandate; injunction denied (dissent would grant injunction) |
Key Cases Cited
- Tandon v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1294 (2021) (comparability test for whether secular activities are treated more favorably than religious exercise)
- Emp. Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (neutral, generally applicable laws need not satisfy strict scrutiny)
- Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (facial neutrality and consideration of government intent under Free Exercise Clause)
- Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021) (discusses when individualized or discretionary exemptions affect general applicability)
- Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008) (preliminary injunction standard)
- Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2011) (sliding‑scale formulation for preliminary injunctions)
- Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63 (2020) (religious‑exercise restrictions require close scrutiny when treating comparable secular activities differently)
- Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (government regulation of conduct to protect public health can limit religious liberty)
- Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (First Amendment rights of students differ in public‑school context)
- Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (courts must not question the sincerity of religious beliefs)