23 F.4th 930
9th Cir.2022Background
- John Doe, a Chinese national UCLA Ph.D. student, was confronted by ex-fiancée Jane Roe on Feb 13, 2017; Roe reported being pushed and later filed a Title IX complaint (13 allegations) on April 13, 2017.
- UCLA imposed an immediate interim suspension (May 2017), banned Doe from campus, and evicted him from student housing; Doe lost his TA position, ability to complete his Ph.D., and ultimately his student visa.
- Investigator Sonia Shakoori’s report found Doe responsible only for the Feb 13 incident, concluding Roe suffered no bodily injury but was placed in reasonable fear; Associate Dean Rush adopted the findings and imposed a two-year suspension (Oct 2017), later affirmed on appeal.
- Doe obtained a state-court stay and the Regents subsequently confessed judgment, vacating the Regents’ disciplinary decision, but Doe had already lost his visa and other opportunities.
- Doe sued the Regents for Title IX sex discrimination (erroneous outcome and selective enforcement theories); the district court dismissed the Title IX claims for failure to plead sex-based discrimination plausibly; Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the FAC plausibly alleged Title IX discrimination on the basis of sex | Allegations of external pressure, internal pattern/practice, and specific procedural irregularities/statements raise plausible inference of sex bias | Allegations are general, conclusory, and fail to connect discipline to Doe’s sex | FAC sufficiently pleads Title IX claim under Schwake; dismissal reversed |
| Whether plaintiff needed to satisfy narrow doctrinal tests (erroneous outcome or selective enforcement) at pleading | Doe argued facts show erroneous outcome/selective enforcement but relied on broader showing that sex was a plausible explanation | Regents relied on Austin and urged heightened or specific-lane pleading | Court applied Schwake: no heightened test; need plausible inference that sex was a cause; Doe met that standard |
| Whether specific statements and procedural irregularities support an inference of bias | Cited Respondent Coordinator’s allegedly gendered comment, Associate Dean’s remarks, failure to investigate ex‑complainant’s misrepresentations, one‑sided evidence handling | Regents said statements/irregularities don’t show sex‑based motive and are insufficient | Court found such statements and procedural irregularities probative and, combined with other allegations, support plausible inference of sex bias |
| Whether dismissal with prejudice and denial of leave to amend was proper | Doe maintained pleadings were sufficient and amendment unnecessary under Schwake | Regents argued amendment would be futile | Court concluded dismissal with prejudice was improper; reversed, vacated, remanded for further proceedings |
Key Cases Cited
- Schwake v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 967 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 2020) (clarifies pleading standard: need only plead facts that give plausible inference of sex discrimination in campus adjudication)
- Austin v. Univ. of Or., 925 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2019) (earlier Ninth Circuit guidance relied on by district court about doctrinal tests)
- Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d 652 (7th Cir. 2019) (supports considering external pressures and circumstantial evidence at pleading stage)
- Doe v. Columbia Coll. Chi., 933 F.3d 849 (7th Cir. 2019) (frames the inquiry as whether facts plausibly raise inference of sex discrimination)
- Doe v. Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 2016) (background indicia and procedural irregularities can inform inference of bias)
- Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575 (6th Cir. 2018) (allegations of biased investigatory and adjudicatory practices survive pleading-stage review)