John Doe v. Prosecutor, Marion C
705 F.3d 694
| 7th Cir. | 2013Background
- Indiana bans sex offenders from using social networking sites and instant messaging if sites allow minors, under Indiana Code § 35-42-4-12; it carries Class A misdemeanor for intent, escalating to Class D felonies on subsequent violations.
- John Doe, a Marion County sex offender convicted of child exploitation, sues claiming First Amendment violation; district court allowed anonymity, certified a class, and conducted a bench trial with affidavits and expert testimony.
- The district court upheld the statute as narrowly tailored and concluded it still left ample alternative channels of communication.
- The Seventh Circuit reviews the First Amendment issue de novo, focusing on whether the statute is narrowly tailored to a substantial government interest and whether it overbreadths protected speech.
- The court compares the statute to Frisby, Vincent, Schneider, and Martin, finding overbreadth and lack of narrow tailoring; acknowledges existing tools could address the goals without broad bans; remands for judgment in favor of Doe and injunction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is the statute narrowly tailored to a significant government interest? | Doe argues the statute is overbroad and not narrowly tailored. | Indiana contends the statute broadly prevents harmful exposure yet remains a targeted tool within legitimate regulation. | Not narrowly tailored; unconstitutional on its face. |
| Does the statute leave ample alternative channels of communication? | (Doe) Argues alternative channels exist but are insufficiently protected due to broad ban. | State asserts enough alternative avenues remain for speech. | Not reached (due to failure on narrow tailoring). |
Key Cases Cited
- Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988) (complete ban must target the exact evil; often narrowly tailored in certain contexts)
- Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (narrow tailoring requires the regulation to be no broader than necessary and consider administrability)
- Turner Broadcasting Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) (content-neutral restrictions may be permissible if narrowly tailored to substantial government interest)
- Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000) (administrability and targeting of evil may justify broad restrictions; focus on the prohibitions’ scope)
- Schneider v. Town of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (blanket prohibitions may be invalid if they ban speech not tied to the evil; require targeted remedies)
- Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (prohibition on all door-to-door distribution upheld only when narrowly tied to dangers; permits alternatives)
- Doe v. City of Albuquerque, 667 F.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2012) (library ban on registered sex offenders analyzed under First Amendment )
- Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 357 (1997) (illustrates cautious, targeted approach; not directly controlling here but informs scrutiny)
- Doe v. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d 757 (7th Cir. 2004) (en banc; upholding certain intrusions under rational basis where First Amendment not implicated)