John Doe v. Kirstjen M. Nielsen, 883 F.3d 716

Plaintiff John Doe invested $500,000 in an EB-5 fund that loaned money to Elgin Memory Care to build a memory-care facility; USCIS denied Doe lawful permanent residence under the EB-5 program, citing concerns including that the project remained unbuilt.
Doe sued USCIS under the Administrative Procedure Act; the district court granted summary judgment for the government, and Doe appealed.
Doe is represented by the Kameli Law Group; firm principal Taher Kameli is separately sued by the SEC for allegedly defrauding numerous EB-5 investors and misappropriating funds tied to the Elgin project.
The SEC alleges Kameli mismanaged funds leaving Elgin unfinished and harmed investors’ immigration prospects; those allegations overlap materially with facts central to Doe’s EB-5 claim.
The Seventh Circuit ordered supplemental briefing on potential conflicts of interest arising from Kameli’s representation and concluded disqualification of the Kameli Law Group was required; the appeal was held in abeyance 60 days to allow substitution of counsel.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Kameli has a conflict of interest that bars representation	Doe submitted a waiver affidavit and maintained counsel can continue	Kameli argued he may continue and the firm can represent Doe despite SEC suit	Court held Kameli has unwaivable conflicts and must be disqualified
Whether conflicts are personal to Kameli or impute to the firm/associate Floss	Doe argued the conflict is personal and Floss can represent him	Government/Court noted small firm structure and Kameli’s control risked limiting Floss’s loyalty	Court held conflict imputed to firm; Floss disqualified under Rule 1.10(a)
Whether informed client consent can cure the conflict	Doe attempted waiver via affidavit	Court emphasized rule that some conflicts cannot be cured by consent when competent/diligent representation is unlikely	Court held the conflicts were nonwaivable because they materially limit representation
Whether continued representation would materially limit advocacy (e.g., pursuit of fraud claims against Kameli)	Doe wanted counsel to challenge USCIS decision possibly without pursuing claims against Kameli	Kameli has incentives to avoid lines of attack that would implicate him; divided loyalty between investor clients	Court held Kameli’s personal and divided loyalties create a significant risk of materially limiting representation and thus disqualification

Freeman v. Chicago Musical Instrument Co., 689 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1982) (courts may disqualify counsel to maintain public confidence and protect the attorney-client relationship)
Owen v. Wangerin, 985 F.2d 312 (7th Cir. 1993) (client consent does not cure conflicts unless lawyer reasonably believes competent representation remains possible)
United States v. Algee, 309 F.3d 1011 (7th Cir. 2002) (conflict exists when ethical constraints prevent meaningful advocacy, such as cross-examination)
People v. Taylor, 930 N.E.2d 959 (Ill. 2010) (defendant must show specific defects in counsel’s strategy attributable to conflict)
Pelham v. Griesheimer, 440 N.E.2d 96 (Ill. 1982) (lawyer owes undivided fidelity to client; divided obligations undermine optimal advocacy)