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John Doe v. Board of Directors of the State Bar of Texas Commission for Lawyer Discipline And Linda Acevedo, in Her Official Capacity as the Chief Disciplinary Counsel of the State Bar of Texas
03-15-00007-CV
| Tex. App. | May 7, 2015
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Background

  • Plaintiffs (students Buchanan and Bomar) were 19-year-old high school athletes with learning disabilities who repeated grades and sought to play in the 1991 season despite the UIL’s "over-19" eligibility rule (ineligible if 19 on Sept. 1 preceding the contest).
  • The UIL enforces a mandatory forfeiture rule that requires a school to forfeit contests if a court later finds a player ineligible; the school districts sought waivers from the UIL but were denied.
  • Plaintiffs sued the UIL seeking injunctive relief under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act; trial court granted permanent injunctions enjoining enforcement of the over-19 rule and awarded attorneys’ fees.
  • UIL appealed, raising four points of error: (1) the rule does not discriminate on the basis of handicap; (2) the rule is not arbitrary or capricious; (3) plaintiffs failed to exhaust IDEA administrative remedies; and (4) the mandatory forfeiture rule and attorneys’ fees were improper.
  • The appellate court addressed mootness concerns (the season ended and students graduated) and applied the "public interest" exception to review; it affirmed the trial court judgment enjoining the over-19 rule and upheld attorneys’ fees.

Issues

Issue Plaintiff's Argument Defendant's Argument Held
Whether the UIL’s over-19 rule violates Section 504 by failing to provide reasonable accommodations The over-19 rule, applied without waiver, denied plaintiffs meaningful access to UIL athletics and a waiver process is a reasonable accommodation The rule is age-based, not handicap-based; purposes (safety, fairness, anti-redshirting) justify a bright-line rule without exceptions Held for plaintiffs: the no-exception over-19 rule must yield to Section 504; a waiver process is a reasonable accommodation
Whether plaintiffs were "qualified handicapped persons" under Section 504 Plaintiffs are learning-disabled and thus qualified UIL argued plaintiffs did not meet the definition Court rejected UIL’s challenge and found plaintiffs qualified
Mootness / jurisdiction after season ended and plaintiffs graduated Plaintiffs argued public interest exception and ongoing consequences (e.g., mandatory forfeiture) preserved review UIL argued case was moot because controversy ended Court applied public interest exception and reviewed merits; did not dismiss as moot
Whether plaintiffs had to exhaust IDEA administrative remedies before suing Plaintiffs contended their claim was under Section 504 (not IDEA) and exhaustion was unnecessary UIL argued plaintiffs must exhaust IDEA procedures (due process hearing) Court found Section 504 claim distinct; exhaustion under IDEA was not required here

Key Cases Cited

  • University Interscholastic League v. Buchanan, 848 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. App. 1993) (affirming injunction against UIL over-19 rule under Section 504 and applying public-interest exception to mootness)
  • Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (U.S. 1985) (reasonable accommodation and meaningful access principles under federal disability law)
  • Brennan v. Stewart, 834 F.2d 1248 (5th Cir. 1988) (precedent on requiring individualized determinations and reasonable accommodation issues)
  • Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (U.S. 1984) (distinction between remedies under IDEA and Section 504)
Read the full case

Case Details

Case Name: John Doe v. Board of Directors of the State Bar of Texas Commission for Lawyer Discipline And Linda Acevedo, in Her Official Capacity as the Chief Disciplinary Counsel of the State Bar of Texas
Court Name: Court of Appeals of Texas
Date Published: May 7, 2015
Docket Number: 03-15-00007-CV
Court Abbreviation: Tex. App.