367 F. Supp. 3d 732
M.D. Tenn.2019Background
- Doe, a Belmont student, was investigated (Oct–Dec 2016) under Belmont’s Sexual Misconduct Policy after a complaint by Student S.; Doe was cleared of sexual misconduct but found to have violated the Deceptive Behavior Policy and residence visitation/Honor Pledge rules and was suspended one semester plus probation and other sanctions.
- Title IX Coordinator Molly Zlock led the investigation, concluded Doe had submitted false/misleading information and violated visitation rules based on texts and interviews, and imposed sanctions; two appeals upheld the sanctions.
- Doe sued under Title IX (retaliation) and Tennessee tort theories (promissory estoppel, negligence, gross negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligent training/supervision). Several other claims had been dismissed earlier.
- Belmont moved to strike a late-disclosed Exhibit A (a 2018 “magazine” screenshot of the Bruin Guide page 21) that Doe relied on for certain theories; the court struck it under Rules 26/37 because Doe failed to timely disclose and Belmont would be unfairly surprised.
- On summary judgment, the court (1) granted Belmont’s motion in full, finding Doe failed to prove Title IX retaliation or raise triable issues on promissory estoppel or any tort claims; and (2) emphasized the investigation followed the Bruin Guide and that collateral discipline was permitted under the preemption clause.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Title IX retaliation (Count III) | Doe says he was punished (collateral discipline) for defending himself in the Title IX investigation, which was retaliatory. | Belmont says Doe did not engage in protected Title IX activity (complaining of sex discrimination), and collateral discipline was for nonretaliatory reasons (untruthfulness, visitation violations). | Summary judgment for Belmont; Doe did not show protected activity or causation. |
| Promissory estoppel (part of Count II) | Doe alleges Zlock promised collateral violations would not be considered during the Title IX investigation and he relied to his detriment. | Belmont says no unambiguous promise was made; Bruin Guide expressly allowed preemption and collateral discipline; Doe suffered no substantial economic harm. | Summary judgment for Belmont; no evidence of an unambiguous promise or detrimental reliance. |
| Negligence / Gross negligence (Counts V & VII) | Doe contends Belmont breached duty by negligently administering/enforcing its Sexual Misconduct Policy. | Belmont contends duties arose from the Bruin Guide (contractual), so tort claims are improper; process was consistent with policy and not unreasonable. | Summary judgment for Belmont; tort claims are contract‑bound or lack proof of breach/unreasonable risk. |
| Negligent infliction of emotional distress & negligent training/supervision (Counts VI & VIII) | Doe claims emotional harm from process and that Belmont failed to train/supervise Zlock/Investigators. | Belmont says there is no underlying negligence, Zlock was qualified and trained, and Doe’s emotional harms are not severe as required. | Summary judgment for Belmont; no severe emotional injury and no proof of negligent training or employer knowledge of unfitness. |
Key Cases Cited
- Roberts ex rel. Johnson v. Galen of Va., Inc., 325 F.3d 776 (6th Cir. 2003) (Rule 37(c)(1) exclusion is mandatory unless violation is harmless or substantially justified)
- Salgado v. General Motors Corp., 150 F.3d 735 (7th Cir. 1998) (sanction of exclusion automatic unless violation justified or harmless)
- Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (summary judgment standard and drawing inferences for nonmovant)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (evidence must be more than merely colorable to defeat summary judgment)
- Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167 (2005) (Title IX encompasses retaliation for complaining of sex discrimination)
- Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013) (but‑for causation in Title VII retaliation; discussion relevant to Title IX causation analysis)