334 F. Supp. 3d 877
M.D. Tenn.2018Background
- Doe, a Belmont University student, was accused of sexual misconduct by Student S.; Belmont investigated and found Doe not responsible for sexual misconduct but disciplined him for alleged untruthfulness and visitation-policy violations, suspending him for one semester and imposing other sanctions.
- Doe appealed; Belmont upheld the findings; Doe withdrew and lost student employment.
- Doe sued under Title IX (not at issue here) and asserted Tennessee state-law claims including breach of contract, promissory estoppel, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), intentional interference with business relations, and unjust enrichment.
- Belmont moved for judgment on the pleadings as to several state-law counts; the court considered the Bruin Guide (student handbook) and the Title IX Determination Letter attached to Belmont’s answer.
- The court applies Rule 12(c) standards (same as Rule 12(b)(6)), construes facts in Doe’s favor, and evaluates whether Doe plausibly alleged breaches of the processes described in the Bruin Guide.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Breach of contract — notice of sexual-misconduct charges / provision of complainant's statement | Belmont failed to timely notify Doe of formal charges and delayed giving Student S.’s written statement, impairing his defense | Bruin Guide procedures were followed; Belmont provided investigatory materials and interviews; no contractual requirement of more | Court: Doe stated a viable breach claim as to delayed notice/provision of complainant’s statement; survives Rule 12(c) on that narrow ground |
| Breach of contract — notice re collateral visitation violations | Doe alleges Belmont assured him visitation violations would not be considered, yet Belmont disciplined him based partly on those violations | Belmont argues Sexual Misconduct Process permits consideration of collateral violations and the handbook controls; any alleged assurance was not contractual | Court: Doe plausibly alleged a specific promise by Zlock that visitation violations would not be considered; claim survives as to promissory-estoppel theory tied to that promise, but not as breach with damages (see damages) |
| Breach of contract — other procedural complaints (right to counsel, cross-examination, investigation adequacy, credibility, bias, sufficiency of evidence) | Doe claims deprivation of meaningful counsel, cross-examination, biased/incompetent investigators, inadequate investigation, and insufficient evidence for untruthfulness finding | Belmont points to Bruin Guide limits (support advisor allowed but not active counsel), absence of hearing in process, investigatory discretion, and detailed Determination Letter explaining findings | Court: Rejected these bases for breach — handbook does not guarantee active counsel, hearings, or specified investigatory methods; credibility and investigator-bias claims are speculative and insufficient; sufficiency explained by Determination Letter; these theories dismissed |
| Damages for breach of contract | Doe seeks lost educational opportunities, future earnings, and other consequential damages after he withdrew | Belmont argues damages are speculative; Doe voluntarily withdrew and did not plead quantifiable losses | Court: Damages alleged are speculative under Tennessee law; without adequate damages, breach claim dismissed in full |
| Promissory estoppel | Doe asserts handbook/promises induced reliance on Belmont’s procedures and admission; claims breaches of fairness | Belmont contends implied contract governs and promissory estoppel cannot supplant or vary contract terms | Court: Promissory-estoppel claim dismissed except for the discrete allegation that Zlock promised not to consider visitation violations — that limited promissory-estoppel claim survives to discovery |
| IIED | Doe alleges Belmont’s conduct was intentional, outrageous and caused severe emotional harm | Belmont argues investigation and sanctions, even if harsh, do not meet Tennessee’s high IIED standard | Court: IIED claim dismissed — conduct not sufficiently outrageous under Tennessee law |
| Intentional interference with business relations | Doe alleges loss of student employment caused by Belmont’s actions | Belmont notes plaintiff’s employment was with Belmont (no third party) so no tortious interference with own contract | Court: Claim dismissed — Belmont cannot tortiously interfere with its own contractual relationship |
| Unjust enrichment (use of Doe’s photo) | Doe alleges Belmont used his photograph for promotion without compensation | Belmont points to handbook authorization for using student images and an opt‑out procedure; complaint lacks specifics about use and alleged benefit | Court: Claim dismissed — inadequate factual detail, questionable benefit, and failure to allege exhaustion of handbook opt-out remedies |
Key Cases Cited
- Hayward v. Cleveland Clinic Found., 759 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 2014) (motion-to-dismiss standard for Rule 12(c) same as Rule 12(b)(6))
- Fritz v. Charter Twp. of Comstock, 592 F.3d 718 (6th Cir. 2010) (pleading requires sufficient factual matter to be plausible)
- Horsley v. Feldt, 304 F.3d 1125 (11th Cir. 2002) (documents attached to pleadings may be considered on Rule 12(c) if integral)
- Commercial Money Ctr., Inc. v. Illinois Union Ins. Co., 508 F.3d 327 (6th Cir. 2007) (documents referenced in pleadings may be considered on a motion to dismiss)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (legal conclusions need not be accepted as true on Rule 12 motions)
- Flaim v. Med. Coll. of Ohio, 418 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2005) (colleges need not allow active legal representation in disciplinary proceedings)
- Doe v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 872 F.3d 393 (6th Cir. 2017) (public-university students may be entitled to cross-examination when credibility determinations decide outcome)
- Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575 (6th Cir. 2018) (similar cross-examination/due process principles for public universities)
- Hall v. Med. Coll. of Ohio, 742 F.2d 299 (6th Cir. 1984) (accused typically not entitled to a statement of reasons where reasons are obvious)