John Doe I v. Exxon Mobil Corp
Civil Action No. 2001-1357
| D.D.C. | May 7, 2021Background
- Plaintiffs allege tort claims under Indonesian law arising from human-rights abuses around Exxon Mobil Oil of Indonesia (EMOI) operations in Aceh; the case has an extensive prior history in this court.
- The Court authorized remote Rule 30(b)(6) depositions under a protocol that barred deponents from accessing litigation-related materials while the deposition was on the record unless those materials were first marked and identified as exhibits.
- On Feb. 15, 2021, plaintiffs deposed Mark Snell (EMOI/ExxonMobil regional general counsel). Snell repeatedly read long, often nonresponsive answers from extensive notes that were not marked as exhibits until the end of the deposition.
- The Court found Snell provided many evasive/nonresponsive answers (110 questions left unanswered in the Court’s tally), and that defense counsel Alex Oh both planned/encouraged the tactic and failed to curb it.
- Plaintiffs moved to compel and for sanctions; defendants cross-moved for sanctions against plaintiffs. The Court granted plaintiffs’ motion to compel and for sanctions (including fees and additional deposition time), denied defendants’ cross-motion, and ordered defense counsel to show cause under Rule 11 for unsupported allegations about plaintiffs’ counsel.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Snell failed to answer deposition questions so as to permit a motion to compel and fee award | Snell gave numerous evasive/nonresponsive answers; Rule 37 treats evasive/incomplete answers as failures to answer; plaintiffs are entitled to compelled responses and expenses | Defendants did not contest most nonresponsiveness or raise privilege; argued some time was spent on other topics | Court: Snell failed to answer 110 questions; motion to compel granted and plaintiffs awarded expenses under Rule 37(a)(5) |
| Whether Snell’s use of unmarked notes during an on-the-record remote deposition violated the Court’s deposition protocol and supports sanctions under Rule 37(b) or inherent authority | Protocol forbade deponent access to litigation materials unless marked/identified; Snell had and read 85+ pages of notes before they were marked, corrupting deposition integrity | Defendants argued marking at end cured the issue and claimed notes had been offered earlier; argued some ambiguity about whether Snell admitted reading from notes | Court: Protocol requires marking before access; Snell violated the order and the violation is sanctionable under Rule 37(b); sanctions imposed |
| Whether defense counsel’s conduct (planning/abetting and making unsupported attacks on opposing counsel) merits sanctions | Counsel preplanned and permitted Snell’s scripted, nonresponsive readings and failed to restrain him; their filings later mischaracterized plaintiffs’ counsel’s demeanor | Defendants denied planning; argued plaintiffs’ counsel interrupted and derailed deposition and served notice in bad faith | Court: By preponderance, counsel expected and abetted scripted answers and failed to curb them; sanctions appropriate; Court ordered show-cause on Rule 11 for unsupported allegations about plaintiffs’ counsel |
| Whether defendants’ cross-motion (bad-faith notice, plaintiff counsel misconduct, improper cancellation) warranted sanctions | N/A (plaintiffs opposed) | Defs. said notice (34 topics) and plaintiffs’ interruptions and cancellation were abusive | Court: Defendants failed to show clear and convincing evidence of bad faith; cross-motion denied; plaintiffs’ cancellation of second deposition was reasonable under circumstances |
Key Cases Cited
- Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991) (recognizes courts' inherent authority to sanction bad-faith and abusive litigation practices)
- Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980) (inherent sanctioning power must be used with restraint and discretion)
- Ali v. Tolbert, 636 F.3d 622 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (standard for imposing sanctions under court’s inherent authority requires clear and convincing evidence)
- Bonds v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 801 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (sanctions must be proportional; consider prejudice and deterrence)
- Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 391 F. Supp. 3d 76 (D.D.C. 2019) (prior decision in the same litigation addressing scope and background of claims)