John Doe 4 v. John Rosa, 664 F. App'x 301

Background

Two minor plaintiffs sued Citadel officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging defendants failed to protect them from a known risk posed by Louis ReVille, who later sexually abused them after leaving employment at The Citadel.
Defendants included The Citadel president (Rosa), an attorney (Brandenburg), an executive assistant (Trez), and a camp director (Garrott); none of the defendants had met or knew the plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs relied on the state-created-danger doctrine, alleging defendants’ actions/inactions created or increased the risk that ReVille would harm plaintiffs post-employment.
Plaintiffs also asserted supervisory-liability claims against Rosa and Garrott for failing to supervise ReVille and tacitly authorizing risk.
The district court granted summary judgment for defendants; the Fourth Circuit affirmed, relying principally on its earlier decision in Doe 2 v. Rosa and concluding plaintiffs failed to show the required nexus and causation.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether defendants can be liable under the state-created-danger doctrine for harms by ReVille after he left employment	Doe plaintiffs argued state actors created or increased a known risk to a readily definable group (minors ReVille would contact) and thus owe protection	Defendants argued plaintiffs were unknown to them, the at-risk class was diffuse (akin to the general public), and the state-created-danger requires a direct, identifiable nexus	Court held no liability: plaintiffs were not known to defendants and the at-risk class was too diffuse, so no state-created-danger claim could attach
Whether the Fourth Circuit’s Doe 2 decision requires the victim be known to the state actor	Plaintiffs argued Doe 2 was misread and other circuits permit liability for a ‘‘readily definable group’’ even if individual victims are unknown	Defendants relied on Doe 2 and argued immediate interaction or knowledge of particular victims is required; otherwise liability would be limitless	Court affirmed Doe 2’s approach: a required nexus exists; here none of the defendants knew the plaintiffs and the group at risk was not sufficiently discrete
Whether supervisory liability applies for harms by a former subordinate after leaving employment	Plaintiffs argued supervisors (Rosa, Garrott) were deliberately indifferent and causally linked to plaintiffs’ injuries	Defendants argued causation ended when ReVille left employment and ReVille was not a state actor, so no underlying constitutional violation	Court held supervisory claims fail because no underlying constitutional violation (ReVille not a state actor) and causation was broken after his departure
Whether Reed and other circuit decisions compel a different result	Plaintiffs cited Reed and other cases to show liability can attach without direct contact if danger is specific and imminent	Defendants distinguished Reed (short duration, limited geographic scope, known risk to identifiable victims) and argued facts here were more attenuated	Court found Reed materially different (short, specific danger) and held it did not require a different outcome here

Key Cases Cited

Doe 2 v. Rosa, 795 F.3d 429 (4th Cir. 2015) (explains state-created-danger requires affirmative acts and a nexus between state actor and plaintiff)
Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122 (7th Cir. 1993) (officers’ actions leaving intoxicated driver in control of vehicle stated a state-created-danger claim under short, specific risk facts)
Estate of Johnson v. Weber, 785 F.3d 267 (8th Cir. 2015) (discusses risk to a group of victims in state-created-danger context)
Glasgow v. Nebraska, 819 F.3d 436 (8th Cir. 2016) (general public is not a limited, precisely definable group for state-created-danger doctrine)
Jones v. Reynolds, 438 F.3d 685 (6th Cir. 2006) (large, unidentified groups do not qualify for state-created-danger protection)
Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791 (4th Cir. 1994) (supervisory liability requires knowledge of pervasive risk and deliberate indifference)
Temkin v. Frederick County Comm’rs, 945 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1991) (no supervisory liability when no underlying constitutional violation)