John Doe 1 v. Miami-Dade County, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 1303

Miami‑Dade County adopted the Lauren Book Child Safety Ordinance in 2005, which prohibits persons convicted of certain sexual offenses against victims under 16 from residing within 2,500 feet (straight‑line) of any school and prescribes criminal penalties for violations.
The Ordinance contains limited exceptions (preexisting residences, juvenile offenders not convicted as adults, schools opened after residency established) and applies for life regardless of state registration requirements.
Plaintiffs (Doe #1, Doe #2, Doe #3, and Florida Action Committee) sued challenging multiple aspects of the Ordinance; only the ex post facto claims against the County were appealed.
Doe #1 and Doe #3 alleged convictions predating the Ordinance (1992 and 1999), and alleged homelessness or forced transience caused by the residency restriction; Doe #2 and FAC did not allege pre‑enactment convictions and thus lacked a retroactivity injury.
The district court dismissed all claims under Rule 12(b)(6); the Eleventh Circuit reviewed de novo whether the complaint states a plausible ex post facto claim and concluded Doe #1 and Doe #3 stated plausible claims.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the residency restriction is an ex post facto law because it is punitive in effect despite a civil intent	The residency rule is punitive in effect: it imposes affirmative restraints (limits housing choice, causes homelessness), is excessive relative to public‑safety aims, and undermines reentry—thus increasing punishment for pre‑enactment convictions	The County intended the Ordinance to be civil and nonpunitive and contends it advances public safety by keeping convicts away from places where children congregate	Applying Smith v. Doe, the court accepted the Ordinance’s civil intent but found Doe #1 and Doe #3 plausibly alleged punitive effects (affirmative restraint and excessiveness); their ex post facto claims survive 12(b)(6) and the case is remanded for further proceedings
Whether plaintiffs other than Doe #1 and Doe #3 suffered a retroactive increase in punishment and thus have standing to bring ex post facto claims	Plaintiffs generally argued the Ordinance applies retroactively to all listed offenders	County pointed out that ex post facto injury requires application to pre‑enactment convictions	Court held only Doe #1 and Doe #3 adequately alleged retroactive application; Doe #2 and FAC failed to allege pre‑enactment convictions and thus their claims were not plausibly pleaded

Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) (establishes framework: determine legislative intent; if civil, assess whether effects are so punitive as to override intent)
Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433 (1997) (defines retroactivity for ex post facto analysis)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading standard for plausibility under Rule 8; governs 12(b)(6) review)
Hill v. White, 321 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 2003) (standard of review for 12(b)(6) dismissal)
Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 693 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2012) (Rule 12(b)(6) standard and role of discovery)
Shaw v. Patton, 823 F.3d 556 (10th Cir. 2016) (applies Smith framework to residency restrictions)
Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2005) (addressing civil/punitive analysis for sex‑offender regulations)
Houston v. Williams, 547 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2008) (applying Smith framework to state ex post facto challenges)