838 F.3d 1050
11th Cir.2016Background
- Miami-Dade County adopted the Lauren Book Child Safety Ordinance in 2005, banning persons convicted of certain sexual offenses against victims under 16 from residing within 2,500 feet (straight-line) of any school; violations carry up to 364 days jail and/or a $1,000 fine.
- Ordinance contains limited exceptions (residence established before enactment, offense committed as a minor not convicted as an adult, or school opened after residence) and applies civilly to persons convicted before enactment.
- Plaintiffs (Doe #1, Doe #2, Doe #3, and FAC) sued challenging the residency restriction as void for vagueness, substantive due process violations, and as an ex post facto law; district court dismissed all claims under Rule 12(b)(6).
- On appeal, only the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ ex post facto challenges against the County was pursued; only Doe #1 and Doe #3 alleged the Ordinance was applied retroactively to pre-enactment convictions.
- Doe #1 and Doe #3 alleged concrete harms: homelessness/transience directly caused by the restriction, inability to secure compliant housing, and resulting barriers to treatment, employment, and stability.
- The County conceded the Ordinance is retroactive and intended as a civil, nonpunitive regulatory scheme; the question became whether its effects are sufficiently punitive to violate federal and Florida ex post facto clauses.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the residency restriction is ex post facto because retroactive | Doe: Restriction applied to pre-enactment convictions and increases punishment by imposing severe residency limits and harms (homelessness, instability) | County: Ordinance is civil and nonpunitive; intended to protect children and promote public safety | Retroactivity undisputed; on pleading stage, Doe #1 & #3 plausibly alleged ex post facto claim based on punitive effects — dismissal reversed as to them |
| Whether the County intended punishment (Smith step one) | Doe: Alleges punitive effects; argues intent should not end inquiry | County: Conceded it intended a civil, nonpunitive regulatory scheme | County’s civil intent accepted; court proceeded to Smith step two |
| Whether the Ordinance is punitive in effect (Smith factors) | Doe: Alleged affirmative restraints on residence, severe housing limitation causing homelessness, and excessiveness relative to recidivism-reduction purpose; asserted that restriction undermines reentry and may increase recidivism | County: Argued restriction rationally furthers nonpunitive public-safety purpose of protecting children | Court: On pleading standard, Doe #1 and Doe #3 sufficiently alleged affirmative disability/restraint and excessiveness to state plausible punitive-effect claim |
| Standing / who can challenge retroactivity | Doe #2 and FAC: sought relief but lacked retroactive application facts | County: Argued plaintiffs must show restriction applied to pre-enactment convictions | Court: Doe #2 and FAC did not plead retroactive application; only Doe #1 and Doe #3 may proceed on ex post facto claims |
Key Cases Cited
- Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) (framework for deciding whether sex-offender regulations are punitive under the Ex Post Facto Clause)
- Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433 (1997) (defines ex post facto as laws that apply retroactively and disadvantage the offender by increasing punishment)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (plausibility pleading standard for Rule 12(b)(6))
- Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 693 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2012) (12(b)(6) review standard — plausible claim permits discovery)
- Hill v. White, 321 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 2003) (de novo review of Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal)
- Houston v. Williams, 547 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2008) (applying Smith framework to state ex post facto challenges)
- Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2005) (applying Smith to residency-like restrictions)
- Shaw v. Patton, 823 F.3d 556 (10th Cir. 2016) (applying Smith framework to residency restrictions)