987 F.3d 1333
11th Cir.2021Background:
- May 2011 work injury to Walker’s back; imaging showed a mild lumbar defect and a pinched nerve; ongoing back and left-leg pain.
- Physical therapist: 5% lumbar impairment; could work an eight-hour day with medium demands but would have difficulty with frequent/constant standing.
- Orthopedic physician: recommended light work, warned Walker might eventually be unable to lift/carry heavy objects; primary-care Dr. Pat Herrera treated Walker with pain meds and recorded largely unremarkable exams.
- Herrera completed disability/workmen’s-comp forms stating Walker was "permanently and totally disabled," with pain and medication side effects severely limiting function; vocational specialist William Crunk (Ph.D.) opined Walker could not maintain an eight-hour workday and had 100% loss of earning capacity.
- ALJ denied benefits, assigned little weight to Herrera’s and Crunk’s opinions as inconsistent with clinical exams and other medical opinions; ALJ found Walker had RFC for sedentary, unskilled work and was not disabled under the five-step analysis.
- Appeals Council denied review; district court affirmed; Eleventh Circuit reviewed for substantial evidence and correct legal standards and affirmed the denial.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether ALJ erred in weighing Crunk’s opinion (vocational specialist) | Crunk concluded Walker could not maintain an 8-hour day and had 100% loss of earning capacity; ALJ gave it little weight | ALJ properly discounted Crunk: not a treating physician and opinion conflicted with medical evidence | Affirmed: ALJ had good cause to assign little weight; substantial evidence supports decision |
| Whether ALJ erred by stating disability determination is "reserved to the Commissioner" and thereby discounting Herrera’s opinion | Walker argued the remark was imprecise and could be used to improperly dismiss Herrera’s medical opinions | Commissioner/ALJ: such statements are non-dispositive; ALJ still evaluated Herrera’s opinions and found them inconsistent with clinical records | Affirmed: ALJ applied correct legal standard, considered Herrera’s opinion, and gave it little weight for good cause |
Key Cases Cited
- Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274 (11th Cir. 2001) (standard of review when Appeals Council denies review)
- Winschel v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176 (11th Cir. 2011) (definition of substantial evidence)
- Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2005) (de novo review of legal conclusions)
- Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219 (11th Cir. 2002) (district court’s review of Commissioner’s substantial-evidence determination)
- Crawford v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155 (11th Cir. 2004) (treating physician rule and substantial weight absent good cause)
- Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436 (11th Cir. 1997) (examples of good cause to discount treating opinion)
- Bjornson v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 640 (7th Cir. 2012) (criticizing imprecise ALJ language that might be read to ignore medical opinions)