John Dickson, II v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
84A01-1611-CR-2705
| Ind. Ct. App. | Dec 19, 2017Background
- In April 2014, 36-year-old John Dickson drove 15-year-old F.F.; police found them unclothed in the backseat, with Dickson on top and his penis erect; F.F. was a minor. Dickson was arrested and charged with Class B felony sexual misconduct with a minor, Class B attempted sexual misconduct with a minor, and Class A misdemeanor public indecency.
- A three-day jury trial occurred in August 2016. After roughly four hours of deliberations, the foreperson sent a note reporting a "holdout" juror who said she had "similar experiences to the alleged victim."
- While the court was assembling counsel to address the note, the jury returned verdicts finding Dickson guilty on all counts. Each juror was polled and affirmed their verdicts individually.
- Dickson moved for a mistrial and later filed a motion to correct error, arguing the trial court abused its discretion by not interrogating or removing the holdout juror and by not sequestering her, thereby violating his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury.
- The trial court denied relief, concluding the jury had reached a verdict before the court could question the juror and that the initial note did not indicate juror impropriety or prejudice requiring remedial action.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning the court properly accepted the verdict and had no duty to interrogate jurors after a verdict was returned absent evidence of prejudice.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court abused its discretion by not questioning or removing a juror who reported "similar experiences" to the victim | State: Court properly accepted verdict and had no basis to interrogate after verdict; no shown impropriety | Dickson: Court should have held a hearing and examined the holdout juror under oath for bias, or removed/sequestered her | No abuse of discretion; court correctly declined to interrogate after verdict and found no substantial risk of prejudice |
| Whether the court was required to sequester the holdout juror immediately upon learning of her comment | State: No obligation to sequester absent substantial risk of prejudice; court acted promptly to assemble parties | Dickson: Immediate sequestration was necessary to preserve impartiality and allow interrogation | No; sequestration not required here and court reasonably determined risk of prejudice was not substantial |
| Whether removal of a juror after deliberations began was warranted | State: Removal post-deliberation implicates unanimity and is only for extreme situations; no evidence supported removal | Dickson: Juror's life experiences made her incapable of fair verdict, justifying removal | Not warranted; removal after deliberations is disfavored and not supported by the record |
| Whether earlier authorities cited by Dickson compelled relief | State: Cases cited are distinguishable because here jury reached verdict before court could act and no indication juror refused to reconsider | Dickson: Analogized to precedents where removal was required for juror bias or immovability | Distinguishable; court affirmed those cases do not control the outcome here |
Key Cases Cited
- Riggs v. State, 809 N.E.2d 322 (Ind. 2004) (removal of juror after deliberations begins is disfavored and permissible only in extreme situations)
- Ramirez v. State, 7 N.E.3d 933 (Ind. 2014) (trial court best positioned to assess need for mistrial or remedial action)
- Gavin v. State, 671 N.E.2d 440 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (reversal where juror removal likely transformed an 11–1 deadlock and was improper)
- Lewis v. State, 424 N.E.2d 107 (Ind. 1981) (procedure when jury reports deadlock is to call them into open court)
- Wright v. State, 12 N.E.3d 314 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (abuse of discretion where juror refused to reconsider due to belief victim lied)
- Scott v. State, 829 N.E.2d 161 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (abuse of discretion where juror’s life experiences led to unchangeable contrary conclusion)
- Nichols v. State, 591 N.E.2d 134 (Ind. 1992) (juror questioning outside presence of parties is improper)
- Agnew v. State, 677 N.E.2d 582 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (trial court must act only when risk of prejudice appears substantial)
- Isaacs v. State, 673 N.E.2d 757 (Ind. 1996) (juror’s personal remarks as a rape victim did not automatically create jury impropriety)