942 F.3d 1047
11th Cir.2019Background
- John Dee Carruth was CEO of Alabama One Credit Union; after prolonged litigation by the “Smyth Group” and years of regulatory scrutiny, the Alabama Credit Union Administration (ACUA) placed Alabama One into conservatorship in August 2015 and removed Carruth as CEO.
- Carruth alleges Smyth, Smyth’s lawyers, Governor Bentley, and Bentley’s legal advisor David Byrne conspired to pressure ACUA to force a conservatorship so Smyth’s clients would obtain settlements.
- Key events: multiple meetings and emails between Smyth, Byrne, Bentley, and state officials; appointment by Bentley of Sarah Moore as ACUA Administrator; ACUA suspensions and later conservatorship/termination.
- Carruth sued Bentley and Byrne under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging equal protection (class-of-one), substantive due process, Takings Clause, First Amendment right to petition/retaliation, and conspiracy; he pleaded three state-law tort claims.
- The district court dismissed all federal claims on qualified immunity grounds and declined supplemental jurisdiction over state claims; the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, finding (inter alia) no plausible causal link and no violation of clearly established law.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Qualified immunity / discretionary function | Bentley and Byrne acted unlawfully (coercion/pressure) so not protected | Appointment and advisory actions fall within Governor/advisor discretionary authority | Actions were discretionary; Step 1 of qualified immunity satisfied |
| Causation (link to conservatorship/termination) | Meetings, emails, and communications show Byrne/Bentley directed Moore/ACUA to act | Conservatorship decision was made by ACUA Administrator Moore and Board; intervening autonomous decisionmakers broke the chain | Allegations conclusory re direction; causation lacking; claims dismissed |
| Equal Protection (class-of-one) | Carruth was treated differently in 2015 than in 2012–13 and thus singled out | Conservatorship/termination are multi‑dimensional regulatory decisions; Engquist bars class-of-one in that context | Class-of-one inapplicable to discretionary regulatory decisions; no clearly established law for plaintiff’s comparator theory; claim fails |
| Due Process (substantive / procedural) | Deprivation of employment/indemnity violated due process | Property-in-employment claims are procedural, not substantive; state statutory remedies (judicial review) exist | Substantive due process claim foreclosed; procedural claim inadequately pleaded and state remedies available; qualified immunity applies |
| Takings Clause | Conservatorship and removal constituted an unconstitutional taking of property/interests | No precedent holds conservatorship/termination is a taking; statute authorizes conservator to terminate contracts | No clearly established Takings violation; claim fails |
| First Amendment retaliation | Temporal proximity (adding Bentley as defendant) shows retaliation for lawsuit | Complaint simultaneously alleges a long‑running conspiracy to remove Carruth predating suit; no plausible timing/causal allegation | Complaint internally inconsistent; no plausible causal link; retaliation claim fails |
| § 1983 conspiracy | Defendants conspired to deprive constitutional rights | No underlying constitutional violation pleaded; defendants entitled to immunity | Conspiracy claim fails for lack of underlying violation and qualified immunity |
Key Cases Cited
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (complaint must plead plausible, nonconclusory factual allegations)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility pleading standard)
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (qualified immunity two‑step framework)
- Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (objective qualified immunity standard)
- Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000) (recognizing class‑of‑one theory)
- Engquist v. Oregon Dep’t of Agr., 553 U.S. 591 (2008) (limits class‑of‑one in discretionary public‑employment/regulatory decisions)
- Dixon v. Burke County, 303 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 2002) (intervening independent decisionmakers can break causal chain)
- Griffin Indus., Inc. v. Irvin, 496 F.3d 1189 (11th Cir. 2007) (multi‑dimensional regulatory discretion not susceptible to class‑of‑one challenge)
- McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550 (11th Cir. 1994) (employment property rights implicate procedural, not substantive, due process)
- United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259 (1997) (when constitutional rule is obvious, qualified immunity may not shield)
- Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) (procedural due process protections for public employees)
- Bennett v. Hendrix, 423 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir. 2005) (elements and causation requirement for First Amendment retaliation claims)
