John-Charles v. California, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 15010

In 2001 California charged Curtis John-Charles with robbery, receipt of stolen property, assault with a firearm, aiding and abetting, entering an inhabited structure, personal use of a firearm, and felon in possession of a firearm.
John-Charles was dissatisfied with his defense counsel and moved to substitute; the trial court denied those motions.
He elected self-representation under Faretta and was granted the right to represent himself after a colloquy confirming knowing and voluntary waiver.
Beginning January 3, 2002, voir dire and trial commenced with John-Charles pro se; the court denied requests to reappoint counsel and to appoint help for jury selection.
On January 9, 2002, John-Charles again sought counsel (Marsden motion) but the court denied; he proceeded to trial and was convicted on all charges.
At the penalty phase the court found a juvenile adjudication qualifying as a strike and sentenced him as a second-strike offender.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether post-Faretta reappointment of counsel is constitutionally required	John-Charles argues there is an absolute right to reappoint counsel.	California courts may deny reappointment after Faretta waiver as not required by clearly established law.	Not clearly established; state court ruling not contrary or unreasonable.
Whether the denial of reappointment was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt	Denial of counsel at trial was structural error warranting automatic reversal.	Error, if any, was harmless given overwhelming evidence and co-defendant conviction.	Harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; affirmed substantial integrity of verdict.
Whether the use of a prior juvenile conviction as a strike under Apprendi was proper	Apprendi/ Tighe require jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt for juvenile priors used to increase sentence.	California’s use of juvenile adjudication as a strike is permissible under existing precedent, including Boyd.	Not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (right to self-representation; open questions on reappointment not clearly established)
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel for indigents at critical stages; but not an absolute right to reinstatement after Faretta waiver)
Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770 (2011) (AEDPA deference; fairminded jurists could disagree; clearly established law requirement)
Menefield v. Borg, 881 F.2d 696 (1989) (right to counsel once waived not absolute; Ninth Circuit authority relied upon)
McCormick v. Adams, 621 F.3d 970 (2010) (mid-trial request for counsel; reaffirmed discretion to deny)
Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044 (2004) (Sixth Amendment right to counsel for sentencing; post-trial context distinguished)
Tighe v. United States, 266 F.3d 1187 (2001) (Apprendi interpretation of juvenile priors not clearly established law for AEDPA purposes)
Boyd v. Newland, 467 F.3d 1139 (2006) (noting Tighe not clearly established for AEDPA purposes; treatment of prior juvenile in sentencing)
United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006) (structural error considerations and right to counsel)