John Brindley v. City of Memphis, Tenn.
934 F.3d 461
6th Cir.2019Background
- Virginia Run Cove (the Cove) is a two-lane paved drive that connects directly to Summer Avenue and provides access to parking for several businesses including a Planned Parenthood clinic, a gas station, a church, and an ICE office; there are no signs telling the public it is private.
- Developer 5325 Summer Avenue Properties recorded a final plat dedicating the streets, rights-of-way, easements, and rights of access "to the public use forever." Shortly after, a quitclaim deed conveyed the Cove to the property owners’ association and described it as a "Private Drive" but referenced the recorded plat.
- On May 1, 2017, John Brindley stood near the Planned Parenthood parking-lot entrance to protest; clinic staff told him the Cove was private, police ordered him to move to Summer Avenue several hundred feet away, and he complied.
- Brindley sued the City of Memphis and officers, asserting (1) First Amendment violation because the Cove is a traditional public forum and his exclusion was unconstitutional, and (2) a vague due process policy claim; he sought a preliminary injunction to access the Cove.
- The district court denied the preliminary injunction for lack of likelihood of success on the merits; the Sixth Circuit reviewed that legal conclusion de novo and considered forum classification dispositive.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Cove is a traditional public forum | Brindley: Cove looks and functions like a public street and therefore public-forum protections apply | City: Cove is privately owned; property-record language (plat/deed) limits public-forum status; physical appearance alone insufficient | Held: Cove is a traditional public forum based on appearance, function, and recorded dedication to public use |
| Whether private ownership defeats forum status | Brindley: Private title does not negate public-forum status where street functions as public | City: Private ownership and deed language show it is a private drive not open as a public forum | Held: Ownership does not control; indistinguishable appearance and public function govern |
| Effect of the final plat dedication and subsequent quitclaim deed | Brindley: Plat dedication (and sale of lots referencing the plat) created an irrevocable dedication or at minimum implied public acceptance | City: Quitclaim describing the Cove as "Private Drive" revoked or limited the dedication | Held: Plat dedication stands; quitclaim referenced the plat (incorporating dedication) and public use/transfer completed dedication |
| Whether strict scrutiny could be met to exclude protesters from the Cove | Brindley: No compelling interest justifies exclusion | City: Did not assert an argument that the restriction survives strict scrutiny on appeal | Held: Because Cove is a traditional public forum, exclusion must survive strict scrutiny; appellees did not show (and could not) that it would |
Key Cases Cited
- Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (public streets are archetypal traditional public fora)
- Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (public fora not limited to government-owned property)
- Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (streets and parks held in trust for public use)
- United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (internal post office sidewalk was nonpublic forum; function matters)
- Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (military compound sidewalks are nonpublic due to special context)
- United Church of Christ v. Gateway Econ. Dev. Corp. of Greater Cleveland, 383 F.3d 449 (privately owned sidewalk functioning as public sidewalk is traditional public forum)
- McGlone v. Bell, 681 F.3d 718 (privately owned sidewalk on campus classified as traditional public forum)
- Miller v. City of Cincinnati, 622 F.3d 524 (forum categories and applicable standards)
- Bays v. City of Fairborn, 668 F.3d 814 (likelihood of success is crucial in First Amendment preliminary injunctions)
- Hall v. Edgewood Partners Ins. Ctr., 878 F.3d 524 (four-factor preliminary injunction standard)
