John Balsewicz v. Jonathan Pawlyk, 963 F.3d 650

Plaintiff John “Melissa” Balsewicz, a transgender inmate taking cross‑gender hormones, reported that inmate Denzel Rivers threatened in the shower, “I’ll beat the fuck out of you” (or a conditional variant) and asked Sergeant Jonathan Pawlyk to report the threat to a supervisor and to keep Rivers from showering with transgender inmates.
Witnesses said Balsewicz appeared agitated, fearful, and pleaded with Pawlyk; Pawlyk took no action.
Two days later Rivers assaulted Balsewicz in a dining hall, punching her repeatedly and causing unconsciousness and facial numbness.
Balsewicz sued Pawlyk under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm; the district court granted summary judgment for Pawlyk, reasoning the threat had lapsed once the shower ended.
The Seventh Circuit considered whether a reasonable jury could find Pawlyk knew of an ongoing, substantial risk and whether he is entitled to qualified immunity; it reversed the summary judgment and remanded.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a genuine issue of material fact exists that Pawlyk knew Balsewicz faced an ongoing substantial risk (subjective element of deliberate indifference)	Balsewicz: she specifically reported Rivers’s threat, appeared fearful, urged reporting and exclusion of Rivers from showers, so a reasonable juror could infer Pawlyk knew and drew the inference	Pawlyk: the shower threat was conditional or expired when the shower ended; complaint was stale or vague, so no knowledge of an ongoing risk	Court: Evidence viewed in plaintiff’s favor permits a reasonable juror to infer Pawlyk knew of an ongoing substantial risk; genuine issue of material fact exists (summary judgment improper)
Whether Pawlyk is entitled to qualified immunity	Balsewicz: Farmer and circuit precedents clearly established that officers must take reasonable measures to abate known risks of inmate assault; inaction thus violated clearly established rights	Pawlyk: law not clearly established for these facts; factual uncertainty precludes fair notice	Court: Under the facts assumed in plaintiff’s favor, Farmer and later cases gave fair notice that doing nothing after learning of an ongoing threat violates the Constitution; no qualified immunity

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (Sup. Ct. 1994) (prison officials must take reasonable measures to abate known substantial risks; deliberate indifference standard)
Velez v. Johnson, 395 F.3d 732 (7th Cir. 2005) (inaction after specific report of danger can violate right to protection from assault)
Gevas v. McLaughlin, 798 F.3d 475 (7th Cir. 2015) (complaint identifying a specific, credible, imminent threat can show official knowledge)
Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765 (Sup. Ct. 2014) (for qualified immunity analysis, courts view facts in plaintiff’s favor on summary judgment)
Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148 (Sup. Ct. 2018) (qualified immunity focuses on whether an officer had fair notice that conduct was unlawful)
Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904 (7th Cir. 2005) (in‑prison assault is a serious harm under Farmer)