John Anderson v. Patrick Donahoe
699 F.3d 989
| 7th Cir. | 2012Background
- Anderson, USPS part-time mail processor since 1998, has chronic asthma with symptoms mainly at work and frequent absences from 2002–2009.
- Anderson filed multiple EEO complaints and OSHA complaints about workplace conditions (mold, dampness) and sought accommodations; USPS investigated mold issues and financed renovations.
- Medical evidence linked his asthma to exposure at work; doctors recommended avoiding mold and irritants and contemplated alternate work environments.
- USPS provided various responses: weathered mold cleanup, transfer to a manual letters area with a dust mask, and accommodation discussions; disputes over receipt of a mask and adequacy of accommodations remain.
- Anderson received removal/suspension notices for absenteeism; he was eventually reassigned and later promoted to full-time; USPS issued a final agency decision denying EEO discrimination in 2009.
- Anderson filed suit in 2009 alleging retaliation under the Rehabilitation Act/ADA, with district court granting summary judgment for USPS; appellate court reviews de novo.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| -retaliation under Rehabilitation Act | Anderson claims USPS retaliated for protected activity by denying/limiting accommodation and threatening discipline. | USPS argues action was not causally related to protected activity and any accommodations or actions were independent responses to conditions and OSHA findings. | No genuine causal connection; summary judgment affirmed for USPS. |
| waiver of disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, and FMLA claims | Anderson preserved these claims in amended pleadings and opposition briefing; should be considered. | Second amended complaint superseded prior pleadings; claims waived; amendment in opposition insufficient. | Claims waived; district court correct to reject them. |
| availability of indirect (McDonnell Douglas) proof on appeal | Should be considered under indirect approach for causation. | waived; only direct approach preserved; no independent evidence of retaliation. | Indirect approach waived on appeal. |
Key Cases Cited
- Caskey v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 535 F.3d 585 (7th Cir. 2008) (causation and proof framework for retaliation claims)
- Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835 (7th Cir. 2012) (protected activity and causation; pretext inquiry; timing)
- Harper v. C.R. England, Inc., 687 F.3d 297 (7th Cir. 2012) (direct evidence of retaliation is rare)
- Scaife v. Cook County, 446 F.3d 735 (7th Cir. 2006) (temporal proximity evidence for causation; need corroborating facts)
- Amrhein v. Health Care Service Corp., 546 F.3d 854 (7th Cir. 2008) (three-month gap may be insufficient for causation on its own)
- Grayson v. O'Neill, 308 F.3d 808 (7th Cir. 2002) (amendment practices and pleading requirements after Twombly)
- Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074 (7th Cir. 2008) (pleading requirements post-Twombly)
- Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (pleading standard for complaints)
- Russell v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill. at Chicago, 243 F.3d 336 (7th Cir. 2001) (five-day suspension sufficiency to survive summary judgment on adverse action)