607 F. App'x 648
9th Cir.2015Background
- Joel Soto-Rodriguez, a Salvadoran national, appealed a final order of removal by the BIA finding him removable for two crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMTs) under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii).
- One conviction at issue was under Washington's witness tampering statute, Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.72.120(1).
- The BIA affirmed the IJ's denial of Soto-Rodriguez's motion to terminate removal, concluding the witness-tampering conviction was categorically a CIMT.
- The Ninth Circuit reviewed the BIA's characterization of the statute de novo after finding the BIA erred in identifying the statute's elements (no Skidmore deference).
- The court analyzed whether the statute necessarily involved fraud or "base, vile, and depraved" conduct and whether the statute was divisible for the modified categorical approach.
- The Ninth Circuit granted the petition for review and remanded with instructions to grant the motion to terminate, concluding the statute is not categorically a CIMT and is indivisible.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the BIA's statutory-element identification warrants deference | BIA correctly identified witness-tampering elements, so its CIMT analysis deserves Skidmore deference | Soto-Rodriguez: BIA misidentified elements (added intent to obstruct justice), so no deference | Court: BIA erred at step one; this part reviewed de novo (no Skidmore deference) |
| Whether WA witness-tampering statute is categorically a CIMT (fraud prong) | Gov: statute targets interference with process and involves dishonest/deceptive conduct implicating fraud | Soto-Rodriguez: statute lacks intent-to-defraud element; withholding information/obstruction is not obtaining value from government | Court: statute does not categorically involve fraud; no inherent intent-to-defraud or obtaining value requirement |
| Whether statute is categorically a CIMT ("base, vile, depraved" prong) | Gov: interference with justice offends fundamental values and should be a CIMT | Soto-Rodriguez: statute requires only knowledge, not specific intent to obstruct; not more culpable than many non-CIMT crimes | Court: statute does not categorically involve conduct that shocks the public conscience; Robles-Urrea reasoning controls |
| Whether the modified categorical approach applies (divisibility) | Gov: statute covers core witness-interference offenses, allowing modified approach | Soto-Rodriguez: statute lists alternative means, not alternative elements; statute is indivisible | Court: statute is indivisible (alternative means, not elements); modified categorical approach inapplicable |
Key Cases Cited
- Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (deference doctrine discussed)
- Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183 (categorical approach and realistic probability test)
- Nunez v. Holder, 594 F.3d 1124 (defining CIMT and categorical analysis)
- Castrijon-Garcia v. Holder, 704 F.3d 1205 (overbreadth and realistic-probability standard)
- Robles-Urrea v. Holder, 678 F.3d 702 (misprision of felony not categorically a CIMT)
- Hernandez-Cruz v. Holder, 651 F.3d 1094 (deference and categorical-step error principles)
- Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903 (general definition of moral turpitude)
- Blanco v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 714 (fraud requires obtaining value from government)
- Goldeshtein v. INS, 8 F.3d 645 (fraud analysis requiring deceit and obtaining value)
- Rendon v. Holder, 764 F.3d 1077 (divisibility/modified categorical approach guidance)