Joe Houston v. Marod Supermarkets, Inc.
733 F.3d 1323
| 11th Cir. | 2013Background
- Joe Houston, a wheelchair user, sued Marod Supermarkets under Title III of the ADA alleging architectural barriers at the Presidente Supermarket (parking, path of travel, restrooms) and sought injunctive relief.
- Marod moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), arguing Houston lacked Article III standing and emphasizing Houston’s history as an ADA “tester” with many similar lawsuits.
- Houston submitted an affidavit: he visited the store twice (one receipt), regularly travels to Miami-Dade for meetings with his lawyers (whose offices are ~1.8 miles from the store), passes the store on his route, and would return if the store were ADA-compliant.
- The district court found Houston a tester, concluded he was not a “bona fide patron,” and dismissed for lack of standing under a four-factor test (proximity, past patronage, definiteness of plan to return, frequency of travel nearby).
- On appeal the Eleventh Circuit held (majority) that tester status does not bar Title III standing and, on the undisputed facts (two visits, receipt, routine travel past the store, lawyers’ office nearby, intent to return), Houston showed a real and immediate threat of future injury and thus has standing.
- The Eleventh Circuit vacated the dismissal and remanded; a dissent argued the court should have affirmed dismissal because Houston is a serial litigator/tester lacking a genuine threat of imminent injury.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a tester’s motive defeats Article III injury-in-fact under Title III ADA | Tester motive does not negate statutory injury; Houston encountered barriers and has a statutory right to full and equal enjoyment | Tester motive shows non- bona-fide patronage and undermines credibility of intent to return, so no standing | Tester motive does not defeat standing; Title III statutory language covers “any individual”/“any person” including testers |
| Whether Houston alleged a real and immediate threat of future injury to seek injunctive relief | Two recent visits (one with receipt), regular travel past store to visit lawyers nearby, and stated intent to return establish imminent risk | Distance (30+ miles), many suits filed elsewhere, and lack of detailed schedule render intent speculative | On the totality of undisputed facts, Houston showed a real and immediate threat and thus standing to seek injunctive relief |
| Proper role of statutory text in limiting who may sue under Title III | Sections 12182(a), 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv), 12188(a)(1) broadly protect “individuals”/“any person”; Congress imposed no bona fide patron limit here | Implied limitation via policy: protect only actual patrons, to avoid fishing expeditions | Court relied on statutory text and precedent: Title III contains no “bona fide patron” requirement for these provisions |
| Interaction with Lujan “some day” intent principle | Houston’s plans are concrete (recent visits, receipt, routine travel past store en route to lawyers); not mere “some day” intent | Lujan prohibits speculative future-intent claims; Houston’s generalized intent insufficient | Distinguished Lujan: Houston’s concrete, frequent travel and recent visits satisfy immediacy requirement |
Key Cases Cited
- Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (Sup. Ct.) (testers have standing when statute creates the legal right violated)
- Watts v. Boyd Properties, 758 F.2d 1482 (11th Cir. 1985) (Eleventh Circuit recognizes tester standing under civil-rights statute by extending Havens rationale)
- Tandy v. City of Wichita, 380 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2004) (testers have standing under ADA Title II; statutory text and enforcement provisions support broad standing)
- Shotz v. Cates, 256 F.3d 1077 (11th Cir. 2001) (plaintiff seeking injunctive relief must plead a real and immediate threat of future injury)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (Sup. Ct.) (mere "some day" intentions are insufficient to establish Article III standing)
- Stevens v. Premier Cruises, Inc., 215 F.3d 1237 (11th Cir. 2000) (allegation of imminent future travel can be sufficient to plead standing for injunctive relief under Title III)