Joe Edward LaRue v. State, 09-14-00441-CR

Background

Victim Donna Pentecost was murdered in 1989; semen from the victim’s mouth later tested positive for Joe Edward LaRue; fingernail scrapings contained a mixture that could not exclude LaRue.
LaRue was indicted, waived a jury in exchange for the State waiving the death penalty, was found guilty of capital murder in 2005, and sentenced to life imprisonment; convictions were affirmed on appeal.
In 2014 LaRue filed a post-conviction motion under Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 64 requesting additional/retesting of various biological items (oral swabs, fingernail scrapings, a hair, a cigarette butt, a bloody fingerprint, and a shirt belonging to a third-party ‘‘Augustine’’).
LaRue argued prior testing produced inconsistent or possibly contaminated results (including alleged blood-type discrepancies) and that newer DNA methods might exculpate him or identify another contributor.
The State conceded identity was at issue and items remained, but argued additional testing would not, by a preponderance, show LaRue would not have been convicted because other inculpatory evidence existed; the trial court denied the motion.
On de novo review, the court held LaRue failed to meet Chapter 64’s burden to show a >50% likelihood he would not have been convicted if testing yielded exculpatory results; denial of the motion was affirmed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether post-conviction DNA testing should be ordered under Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 64	LaRue: newer/more accurate testing could show contamination or exclude him; retesting could identify another contributor (including Augustine), making conviction unlikely	State: evidence was previously tested; additional testing would not, by preponderance, show LaRue would not have been convicted given other substantial inculpatory evidence	Denied — LaRue failed to prove by preponderance (>50% chance) that exculpatory results would have prevented conviction
Whether previously tested material qualifies for retesting with newer techniques	LaRue: prior tests were inconsistent; newer techniques may be more probative	State: prior testing exists and admitted evidence; movant must show reasonable likelihood new testing is more probative	Denied — LaRue did not show new testing would be more probative or change outcome
Whether presence of another person’s DNA would be exculpatory	LaRue: identifying another contributor would place someone else at the scene and could exonerate him	State: presence of third‑party DNA alone does not negate other inculpatory evidence	Held that third‑party DNA, at best, shows another person may have been present and is not necessarily exculpatory
Whether chain-of-custody or evidence condition issues justified testing	LaRue: alleged integrity problems with blood sample and inconsistent lab results justify retesting	State: chain‑of‑custody and existence of evidence not disputed, but movant must show effect on conviction	Denied — integrity allegations insufficient to meet Article 64’s preponderance burden

Key Cases Cited

State v. LaRue, 108 S.W.3d 431 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2003) (trial court suppression reversed)
State v. LaRue, 152 S.W.3d 95 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (affirming reversal)
Whitfield v. State, 430 S.W.3d 405 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (Chapter 64 governs post-conviction DNA testing)
Holberg v. State, 425 S.W.3d 282 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (movant must satisfy Chapter 64 preconditions)
Leal v. State, 303 S.W.3d 292 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (>50% chance standard for showing movant would not have been convicted)
Routier v. State, 273 S.W.3d 241 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (new techniques must be reasonably likely to be more probative)
Wilson v. State, 185 S.W.3d 481 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (movant must show how new results would affect conviction)
Gutierrez (Ex parte Gutierrez), 337 S.W.3d 883 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (favorable DNA must meaningfully cast doubt on conviction)
Prible v. State, 245 S.W.3d 466 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (third‑party DNA does not necessarily exculpate given other evidence)
Swearingen v. State, 303 S.W.3d 728 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (threshold showing that evidence contains biological material)
Rivera v. State, 89 S.W.3d 55 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (presence/absence of DNA under fingernails not dispositive)
Whitaker v. State, 160 S.W.3d 5 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (standard of review discussion)
Smith v. State, 165 S.W.3d 361 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (review de novo when no live hearing)
Bell v. State, 90 S.W.3d 301 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (Chapter 64 threshold requirements)
Hood v. State, 158 S.W.3d 480 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (third‑party DNA at most shows co‑participant)