Jockey Club Condo. Apts., Inc. v. B.V.K., LLC
237 So. 3d 1118
| Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | 2018Background
- BVK purchased a condominium parking lot (the Parcel) at a 2008 tax deed sale after taxes were unpaid; BVK could not access the Parcel because it is inside a gated condominium community.
- Litigation followed: BVK sued Jockey Club and related entities seeking declaratory relief and unjust enrichment; defendants argued the tax deed sale was invalid because tax bills were mailed to the wrong entity (Jockey Holdings, Inc.).
- Trial court entered an amended summary-judgment order (Oct. 29, 2015) invalidating the tax deed sale and ordering a new sale; the County Clerk and BVK moved for relief under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.540(b).
- While the 1.540 motions were pending, BVK obtained a quitclaim from a purported successor owner, which the trial court found cured the due-process concerns.
- The trial court issued a Sept. 30, 2016 order vacating the Oct. 29, 2015 judgment, validating the tax deed sale, and declaring BVK the Parcel’s owner; Jockey Club filed a motion for rehearing (Oct. 11, 2016) and the trial court denied rehearing (Dec. 14, 2016).
- Jockey Club filed an appeal on Jan. 6, 2017; the Third District dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the appeal was untimely as to the Sept. 30 order and the rehearing order was not separately reviewable under the controlling rules and precedent.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Jockey Club) | Defendant's Argument (BVK/County Clerk) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Sept. 30, 2016 order is appealable despite Jockey Club’s post-order rehearing motion | The Oct. 11 rehearing motion tolled rendition of the Sept. 30 order, so the Jan. 6, 2017 notice of appeal is timely | Motions for rehearing directed to orders entered on Rule 1.540(b) motions do not toll rendition; notice was untimely | Rehearing did not toll rendition of the Rule 1.540 order; the Sept. 30 order was final for appeal-timing purposes and Jockey Club’s appeal was untimely |
| Whether the district court may separately review the order denying rehearing | The rehearing-order denial should be separately reviewable (or viewed as extending tolling) | Rule 9.130(a)(4) generally bars separate review of rehearing denials; precedent disfavors separate appeals of rehearing denials on 1.540 orders | Separate review of the rehearing-order denial is barred here; jurisdiction to review it separately is lacking |
| Whether the New Day Miami exception permits separate review of the rehearing denial | The circumstances justify exception | New Day Miami exception applies only in narrow situations (e.g., when a party was not previously adjudicated and the 1.540 order is the first adjudication as to that party) | New Day Miami exception does not apply: Jockey Club was a party to the prior adjudication, so the exception is inapplicable |
Key Cases Cited
- New Day Miami, LLC v. Beach Developers, LLC, 225 So. 3d 372 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (allowed separate review of rehearing denial in unique circumstance where 1.540 order was first adjudication as to a party)
- Medley Plaza, Inc. v. The Rama Fund, LLC, 196 So. 3d 512 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) (timeliness rules for appeals of 1.540 orders)
- Ricardo v. Wells Fargo Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 166 So. 3d 967 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of appeal from rehearing denial of a 1.540 order)
- Clearwater Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Sampson, 336 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 1976) (principle that a post-decretal adjudication may be an authorized rehearing when the party was not previously adjudicated)