192 A.3d 381
Vt.2018Background
- CCTA runs a volunteer driver program transporting riders outside regular routes; volunteers use personal vehicles and must meet training/background checks and follow CCTA policies.
- Volunteers submit mileage logs and are paid at the federal mileage rate; CCTA labels these payments as "reimbursement" and verifies mileage randomly.
- Perrault began volunteering in 2014, averaging about $265.49/week from CCTA mileage payments, and was injured in a car accident while transporting a rider on December 1, 2015.
- Perrault sought workers’ compensation; the Commissioner granted CCTA summary judgment, concluding the per-mile payments were reimbursements (not "wages") and Perrault was a gratuitous volunteer, not a statutory employee.
- The central legal question certified to the Vermont Supreme Court: whether Perrault was an "employee" under 21 V.S.A. § 601(14) at the time of her injury.
- The Court framed the issue under the first clause of the statutory employee definition ("entered into the employment of") and focused on whether statutory "wages" existed as a threshold requirement.
Issues
| Issue | Perrault's Argument | CCTA's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Perrault was an "employee" under 21 V.S.A. § 601(14) (first prong: "entered into the employment of") | Payments and relationship show employment; disputed facts (manual ambiguity, Perrault’s intent re: payments) make summary judgment inappropriate | Payments are reimbursements for mileage, not wages; absent wages there is no statutory employment | Held: Not an employee. Payments were reimbursements, not wages, so no employment under first statutory prong. |
| Whether the volunteer manual or parties’ intent controls the employment question | Manual ambiguity and Perrault’s intent to treat payments as wages create factual disputes | Employer’s labels and statutory definitions control; parties’ intent/common-law factors do not override wage requirement | Held: Parties’ intent or manual disclaimer do not determine statutory status; statutory definitions control. |
| Whether common-law tests (right-to-control, nature-of-business) should decide status | These tests support finding an employment relationship and were not considered | Tests are inapt here because threshold wage element is unresolved | Held: Court need not apply those tests once wages are absent; Commissioner rightly did not reach them. |
| Whether regular monetary payments sufficient to establish "wages" for workers’ compensation | Regular payments integrated into Perrault’s budget indicate wages | Payments calculated at federal mileage rate reimburse depreciation/expenses and thus are excluded from the statutory wage definition | Held: Payments reimburse expenses/depreciation (not gain); statutory definition excludes such reimbursements, so they are not wages. |
Key Cases Cited
- St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Surdam, 595 A.2d 264 (Vt. 1991) (workers’ compensation remedial purpose; liberal construction to provide benefits unless law clearly bars recovery)
- Wolfe v. Yudichak, 571 A.2d 592 (Vt. 1989) (volunteer student fireman lacked workers’ compensation remedy where no calculable average weekly wage)
- Quinn v. Pate, 197 A.2d 795 (Vt. 1964) (statutory definition of wages equated with broader concept of earnings for compensation calculations)
- Candido v. Polymers, Inc., 687 A.2d 476 (Vt. 1996) (use of right-to-control and nature-of-work tests to distinguish employees from independent contractors/indirect-employer analyses)
- Falconer v. Cameron, 561 A.2d 1357 (Vt. 1989) (statutory employment can exist despite contractual language intended to avoid employment relationship)