Joan Summy-Long v. Penn State University
17-1206
| 3rd Cir. | Nov 6, 2017Background
- Dr. Joan Summy-Long sued Penn State alleging sex-based wage discrimination (Title VII, Title IX, EPA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 & 1985, PHRA, and state claims); she abandoned two state claims before decision.
- District Court granted summary judgment to Penn State; Summy-Long appealed.
- She sought to convert her disparate-treatment case to a disparate-impact theory at summary judgment; the court refused as untimely.
- The courts applied the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to Title VII/IX and used job-content analysis for the Equal Pay Act claim.
- Penn State defended lower pay based on documented deficiencies in Summy-Long’s academic performance (publications, failure to secure timely external funding, declined roles).
- The District Court also denied a late motion to compel broad historical discovery and rejected claims of judicial bias; the Third Circuit affirmed on all issues.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Request to pursue disparate-impact theory at summary judgment | Summy-Long asked the court to treat her claim as disparate impact based on salary studies showing group disparities | Penn State argued the case was litigated as disparate treatment and the impact theory was raised too late | Denied — raising a new disparate-impact theory at summary judgment is untimely and prejudicial |
| Title VII / Title IX sex-discrimination (prima facie and pretext) | Statistical salary studies and reports showed female faculty (including Summy-Long) were paid less than male comparators | Penn State provided legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons: substandard academic performance, lack of publications, failure to obtain external funding, and missed grant renewals | Affirmed — Summy-Long failed to establish a prima facie disparate-treatment case and offered no evidence that Penn State’s reasons were pretextual |
| Federal Equal Pay Act (substantially equal work) | Summy-Long asserted male colleagues performed substantially equal work but were paid more | Penn State showed pay differences resulted from its merit-based system tied to publications and external funding | Affirmed — even if prima facie established, Penn State’s merit-system defense was sufficient and unrebutted |
| Retaliation (adverse actions & causation) | Summy-Long alleged reduced lab space, omission from website, medical misdiagnosis, and hostile conditions were retaliatory after protected activity | Penn State argued these were not adverse (space tied to grants, outdated website, non-party doctors, minor slights) and lacked causal link to protected activity | Affirmed — actions were not sufficiently adverse and no causal connection shown |
| Discovery motion to compel (scope and timeliness) | Summy-Long sought extensive historical performance/salary records (back to 1970s) and moved to compel late in discovery | Penn State objected; court limited discovery to post-June 2, 2003 and denied late motion as untimely and prejudicial | Affirmed — District Court did not abuse discretion; motion untimely and expansion after years of litigation improper |
| Judicial bias claim | Summy-Long alleged the District Judge was biased against her | Penn State and record showed critical comments reflected frustration with litigation conduct, not deep-seated prejudice | Affirmed — record lacked the degree of favoritism or antagonism required to show bias |
Key Cases Cited
- Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (defines disparate-impact theory and neutral practices causing discriminatory effects)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (establishes burden-shifting framework for discrimination claims)
- Healy v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 860 F.2d 1209 (3d Cir. 1988) (cautions use of statistical evidence in disparate-treatment cases)
- Sarullo v. U.S. Postal Serv., 352 F.3d 789 (3d Cir. 2003) (elements of prima facie discrimination case)
- Stanziale v. Jargowsky, 200 F.3d 101 (3d Cir. 2000) (explains employer’s burden to articulate legitimate reasons after prima facie case)
- Josey v. John R. Hollingsworth Corp., 996 F.2d 632 (3d Cir. 1993) (upholds refusal to permit new disparate-impact theory raised late)
- Brobst v. Columbus Servs. Int’l, 761 F.2d 148 (3d Cir. 1985) (Equal Pay Act requires comparison of actual job content)
- Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994) (standard for judicial bias requiring deep-seated favoritism or antagonism)