Joan Stephens v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.
529 S.W.3d 63
Tenn. Ct. App.2016Background
- Joan Stephens, hired by temporary agency Belcan to work in Home Depot’s “Weekend Warrior” program, fell from a ladder while retrieving Bayer CropScience product and sued multiple defendants including Bayer CropScience.
- Plaintiffs amended pleadings several times; Bayer CropScience was added and filed an initial answer in February 2015 denying it employed Stephens and denying duty to train her.
- Bayer later sought leave (after new counsel appeared) to amend its answer to add an affirmative defense that it was a “borrowing employer” entitled to workers’ compensation exclusivity under the loaned-servant doctrine; the trial court allowed the amendment.
- Bayer moved under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) to dismiss, arguing the amended complaint on its face showed Bayer was a statutory/borrowing employer and thus immune from common-law claims; Plaintiffs responded mainly with a waiver argument and did not contest the substance.
- The trial court granted dismissal for failure to state a claim, certified finality under Rule 54.02, and this appeal followed; the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether trial court improperly relied on the “entire record” so Rule 12.02(6) standard was not applied | Stephens: reference to the entire record shows the court treated the motion as summary judgment; dismissal should be reversed | Bayer: motion was 12.02(6); dismissal based on allegations in the complaint showing exclusivity | Court: treated ruling as Rule 12.02(6); isolated reference to record did not convert motion; dismissal appropriate |
| Whether workers’ compensation exclusivity bars a contract claim alleging Bayer agreed to provide benefits beyond statute | Stephens: contractual promise to extend benefits precludes exclusivity; constitutional argument raised for first time on appeal | Bayer: exclusivity applies if Bayer is borrowing employer; plaintiffs didn’t preserve contract/constitutional argument below | Court: plaintiffs waived new contract/constitutional arguments by not raising them at trial; court declined to reach them |
| Whether Bayer waived workers’ compensation immunity by not pleading it earlier and by denying it was employer | Stephens: Bayer’s earlier pleadings denying employer status and delay amount to waiver and prejudice | Bayer: affirmative defenses can be amended; Rule 15 liberal; amendment made before trial and promptly after new counsel appeared | Court: no abuse of discretion in allowing amendment; no waiver — amendment timely under Rule 15 standards |
| Whether the loaned-servant test is satisfied on the face of the complaint so dismissal for failure to state a claim was proper | Stephens: did not contest three-prong test on appeal | Bayer: complaint’s allegations (hired via Belcan to benefit Bayer, contract between Belcan and Bayer, duties promoting Bayer products) establish borrowing employer | Court: complaint’s allegations sufficiently implicated loaned-servant doctrine such that exclusivity appears on its face; dismissal proper |
Key Cases Cited
- Webb v. Nashville Area Habitat for Humanity, Inc., 346 S.W.3d 422 (Tenn. 2011) (Rule 12.02(6) standard: pleadings construed liberally; facts presumed true)
- Tigg v. Pirelli Tire Corp., 232 S.W.3d 28 (Tenn. 2007) (Rule 12 principles and inference rules)
- Anthony v. Tidwell, 560 S.W.2d 908 (Tenn. 1977) (affirmative defense that plainly appears on face of complaint permits dismissal)
- Bennett v. Mid-S. Terminals Corp., 660 S.W.2d 799 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983) (loaned servant three-prong test for borrowing employer)
- Pratcher v. Methodist Healthcare Memphis Hosps., 407 S.W.3d 727 (Tenn. 2013) (general waiver rule for affirmative defenses and judicial discretion to allow amendments)
- Hammett v. Vogue, Inc., 165 S.W.2d 577 (Tenn. 1942) (historic rule requiring special plea of workers’ compensation; distinguished in light of modern Rules)
- Gardiner v. Word, 731 S.W.2d 889 (Tenn. 1987) (liberality of Rule 15 leave-to-amend standard)