Joan Kedra v. Richard Schroeter
876 F.3d 424
| 3rd Cir. | 2017Background
- Pennsylvania State Trooper David Kedra was killed during a routine firearms training when instructor Corporal Richard Schroeter pointed an operational handgun at Kedra and pulled the trigger without conducting required safety checks; the gun was loaded and Kedra died from the wound.
- Schroeter was a 20-year veteran and a certified firearms instructor who had signed written safety protocols requiring safety checks, a second-person verification, treating all guns as loaded, not pointing at persons, and visually/physically verifying an unloaded chamber before any trigger pull.
- Schroeter pleaded guilty in Pennsylvania state court to multiple counts of reckless endangerment and retired from the State Police.
- Kedra’s mother (personal representative) filed a § 1983 suit alleging a Fourteenth Amendment state-created danger substantive due process violation based on Schroeter’s conduct; Schroeter moved to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds.
- The District Court granted qualified immunity, reasoning the complaint alleged only an objective deliberate-indifference theory (i.e., obvious risk) rather than subjective actual knowledge, and that an objective standard was not clearly established at the time of the shooting.
- The Third Circuit reversed: it held the complaint sufficiently pleaded subjective deliberate indifference (actual awareness of a substantial risk) given the combination of obvious risk, Schroeter’s training and written acknowledgments, and his guilty plea; the court concluded the right was clearly established and remanded for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the complaint pleads deliberate indifference under the then‑controlling (subjective) standard | Kedra alleges facts permitting a reasonable inference Schroeter had actual awareness of a substantial risk (obvious danger, instructor training, written safety acknowledgements, guilty plea) | Schroeter contends plaintiff only alleges what he should have known (objective obviousness), not that he actually knew a round was in the chamber | Held for plaintiff: the complaint plausibly pleads subjective deliberate indifference when read as a whole; obviousness, training, protocol violations, and guilty plea support an inference of actual knowledge |
| Whether an objective standard (risk so obvious that it should be known) was clearly established at the time | Plaintiff sought to rely on objective obviousness but primarily alleges subjective knowledge | Defendant argued only objective obviousness was pleaded and that objective theory was not clearly established pre-Kedra shooting | Held: objective theory was not clearly established at the time, but not outcome-determinative because plaintiff pleaded subjective knowledge |
| Whether Schroeter is entitled to qualified immunity because the right was not clearly established in the specific factual context | Plaintiff: existing Supreme Court and Circuit precedent gave fair warning that deliberately exposing a defenseless trainee to lethal risk contrary to safety protocols was unconstitutional | Defendant: lacked sufficiently similar precedent; reasonable officer could think conduct lawful absent on-point authority | Held: right was clearly established in context — an individual has a right not to be subjected defenselessly to a police demonstration of deadly force contrary to known safety protocols |
| Relevance of Schroeter’s state criminal guilty plea to the § 1983 pleading-stage analysis | Plaintiff: guilty plea is a party admission probative of Schroeter’s mental state and supports an inference of conscious disregard | Defendant/District Court: guilty plea should not be used to preclude relitigation or establish constitutional culpability without collateral-estoppel prerequisites | Held: plea is admissible as an allegation supporting an inference of actual knowledge at pleading stage (not used as offensive collateral estoppel) and contributes to plausibility of the § 1983 claim |
Key Cases Cited
- Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (constitutional right must be clearly established for qualified immunity)
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (two‑prong qualified immunity framework)
- Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (subjective knowledge may be inferred from obviousness of risk)
- County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (due process ‘‘shocks the conscience’’ standard)
- DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (limits on affirmative state duty; source of state‑created danger doctrine)
- Sanford v. Stiles, 456 F.3d 298 (3d Cir. 2006) (discussed subjective vs. objective deliberate‑indifference standards)
- L.R. v. School District of Philadelphia, 836 F.3d 235 (3d Cir. 2016) (applied objective obvious‑risk reasoning in state‑created danger context)
- Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199 (3d Cir. 1996) (obvious risk can support inference of knowledge)
- Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224 (3d Cir. 2008) (obviousness and foreseeability relevant to state‑created danger)
- Beers‑Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120 (3d Cir. 2001) (official cannot reasonably believe conduct lawful while also recognizing excessive risk)
- Marrero‑Rodríguez v. Municipality of San Juan, 677 F.3d 497 (1st Cir. 2012) (analogous firearms‑training facts supporting state‑created danger claim)