Jlg Trucking, Llc v. Lauren R. Garza
466 S.W.3d 157
| Tex. | 2015Background
- July 16, 2008: Garza was rear‑ended by a JLG Trucking employee; she sought treatment and later physical therapy for neck/back pain.
- October 9, 2008: Garza was in a second collision; transported to hospital on a backboard with a cervical collar and complained of neck pain; MRI soon thereafter showed cervical herniations.
- Garza sued JLG for negligence arising from the July collision and called her treating surgeon, Dr. Pechero, to testify that the July crash caused her herniated discs and resulting damages; JLG retained a neuroradiologist, Dr. Berberian, who opined degeneration, not trauma.
- JLG sought to introduce evidence of the October crash as an alternative cause; Garza moved pretrial to exclude all evidence of the second accident as irrelevant and prejudicial; the trial court granted the motion and excluded that evidence.
- The jury returned a large verdict for Garza; the court of appeals affirmed the exclusion, reasoning expert proof was required to link the second collision to the injuries.
- The Texas Supreme Court reversed: evidence of the second accident was relevant to causation and exclusion was harmful, particularly because it prevented probing Dr. Pechero’s basis for ruling out the October collision.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of evidence of the second (October) accident | Garza: second accident is not causally connected to her injuries and including it would confuse/jurors and be unfairly prejudicial | JLG: evidence of the second accident is relevant as an alternative plausible cause of the injuries and necessary to challenge causation | Court: Evidence of the second accident was relevant under Tex. R. Evid. 401; exclusion was an abuse of discretion |
| Whether expert proof was required to make the second accident relevant | Garza: absent expert linking the October accident to the herniations, the evidence is inadmissible | JLG: expert testimony is not required for relevance; factual records and temporal proximity make the October crash a plausible alternative cause | Court: The court of appeals conflated relevance with sufficiency; lack of an expert for defendant goes to weight, not relevance; exclusion improperly shifted plaintiff’s burden |
Key Cases Cited
- Interstate Northborough P’ship v. State, 66 S.W.3d 213 (Tex. 2001) (standard of review for exclusion of evidence: abuse of discretion)
- Guevara v. Ferrer, 247 S.W.3d 662 (Tex. 2007) (expert testimony required to prove medical causation beyond jurors’ common knowledge; relevance distinct from legal sufficiency)
- Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Crye, 907 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. 1995) (causation requires proof that defendant’s conduct caused an event which caused compensable injury)
- Transcontinental Ins. Co. v. Crump, 330 S.W.3d 211 (Tex. 2010) (plaintiff must exclude other plausible causes with reasonable certainty when expert proof is required)
- Reliance Steel & Aluminum Co. v. Sevcik, 267 S.W.3d 867 (Tex. 2008) (harmless‑error framework for evidentiary rulings; consider whether excluded evidence was crucial to key issue)
- E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1995) (expert must consider and rule out alternative causes when proving medical causation)
- Farmers Tex. Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Pagan, 453 S.W.3d 454 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014) (distinguishable—court excluded alternative‑cause evidence where record lacked factual support linking the incident to the injuries)
