Jinkins v. Jinkins
2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 4340
| Tex. App. | 2017Background
- Grandparents (Wiley Sr. and Celeste) executed a 1942 joint will creating a testamentary trust: surviving spouse had life estate in income and their son (Father) had a remainder interest in corpus.
- Parents (Mother and Father) executed a 1950 joint will; upon the first death all residuary property (including any devisable interest Father had under the grandparents’ will) passed to a trust that gave the survivor income and provided that corpus would ultimately be divided equally among the parents’ children who survived to age 30 (Randy and Wiley were the named beneficiaries of the children’s share).
- After Mother died in 1952, the parents’ joint will was probated and the parents’ testamentary trust was created; Father later remarried and had two more children (Jeffrey and Mary).
- Father executed some quitclaim deeds and oil-and-gas leases at various times; he executed quitclaims removing the Galveston house from the parents’ trust for himself (conceded), and executed some quitclaims only in his capacity as co‑trustee for his life‑tenant share (no companion quitclaims for the children’s trust share). A 1976 lease described some tracts as Father’s “sole and separate property.”
- Father’s 1993 individual will (probated 2001) revoked prior wills but did not mention or expressly revoke the parents’ trust; it created a residuary trust to give corpus to all four children equally on the surviving spouse’s death. No trust properties were listed in Father’s estate inventory; Randy and Wiley received royalty payments consistent with the parents’ trust until a 2013 letter raised title questions.
- Randy sued (initially seeking declaratory relief, later repleading trespass‑to‑try‑title) seeking a declaration that he and Wiley each own 1/2 of 17 disputed mineral interests; trial court granted summary judgment that each of the four children owns a 1/4 interest and dismissed Randy’s declaratory‑judgment claim as improper. Randy appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Randy) | Defendant's Argument (Jeffrey/Mary/Wiley) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Father’s remainder interest in grandparents’ trust was a vested remainder transferable into the parents’ trust | Father had a vested remainder from 1947 that could be transferred | Father’s remainder wasn’t transferable until distribution on Grandmother’s death | Vested remainder; transferable (court so held) |
| Whether Father’s vested remainder passed into the parents’ trust when the parents’ joint will probated in 1952 | Parents’ will expressly transferred all property of either spouse, including Father’s devisable interest under grandparents’ will, into parents’ trust | The trust covered only Mother’s property or did not capture Father’s remainder | Passed into parents’ trust in 1952 (court so held) |
| Whether Father’s 1993 will revoked the parents’ trust so disputed property passed under the 1993 will to four children | 1993 will revoked prior wills and thus revoked/displaced the parents’ trust | Parents’ joint will was irrevocable except by written mutual consent; 1993 will did not mention or clearly revoke the trust | 1993 will did not revoke parents’ trust; trust remained effective |
| Whether any disputed properties were transferred out of the parents’ trust to Father’s separate estate (so 1993 will governs) | Father’s quitclaims and 1976 lease show he converted some tracts to his separate property | Quitclaims at issue transferred only Father’s life‑tenant interests; no evidence corpus was removed; 1976 lease is ambiguous | No evidence corpus was removed; disputed minerals remained trust corpus and passed to Randy and Wiley equally |
Key Cases Cited
- Martin v. Amerman, 133 S.W.3d 262 (Tex. 2004) (trespass‑to‑try‑title is the required method for disputes over title to real property)
- Coinmach Corp. v. Aspenwood Apartment Corp., 417 S.W.3d 909 (Tex. 2013) (claims seeking superior title and possessory relief must be brought as trespass‑to‑try‑title)
- San Antonio Area Foundation v. Lang, 35 S.W.3d 636 (Tex. 2000) (will construction focuses on testator’s intent as expressed within the four corners of the will)
- City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802 (Tex. 2005) (summary‑judgment and evidence‑sufficiency principles; equally plausible inferences do not create fact issues)