Jimmy Yamada v. William Snipes
786 F.3d 1182
| 9th Cir. | 2015Background
- A-1 A-Lectrician, Inc. (A-1), a Hawaii for-profit electrical-construction corporation (CEO Jimmy Yamada), spent >$50,000 on contributions and ~$6,000 on newspaper ads in 2010 and was required to register as a “noncandidate committee” under HRS § 11-302 and to include advertising disclaimers under HRS § 11-391.
- Plaintiffs (Yamada, Russell Stewart, and A-1) sued state Campaign Spending Commission members challenging: (1) HRS § 11-302 definitions ("expenditure", "noncandidate committee", "advertisement") as void for vagueness; (2) reporting/registration/disclosure requirements for noncandidate committees under the First Amendment; (3) HRS § 11-391 disclaimer requirement; (4) HRS § 11-355 ban on contractor contributions as applied; and (5) HRS § 11-341 electioneering communication reporting (standing/justiciability issue).
- District court denied A-1’s summary judgment claims and permanently enjoined HRS § 11-358 ($1,000 limit on contributions to noncandidate committees) as applied to Yamada and Stewart; A-1 appealed the adverse rulings; Yamada & Stewart sought § 1988 fees for earlier interlocutory appeal defense.
- Ninth Circuit panel considered as-applied and vagueness challenges, adopted a narrowing construction proffered by the Commission ("influence" means express advocacy or its functional equivalent), and evaluated burdens under exacting/closely drawn scrutiny.
- Court affirmed most of the district court’s rulings (upholding definitions, reporting/disclosure, and disclaimer requirements; upholding contractor contribution ban as applied) but reversed the district court’s refusal to consider appellate fees for Yamada and Stewart and referred fee amount to the Appellate Commissioner.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Vagueness of "expenditure" and "noncandidate committee" in HRS § 11-302 | Terms like "influence" are vague; statute could reach issue speech | Commission: "influence" should be read to mean express advocacy or its functional equivalent; narrowing construction cures vagueness | Adopted Commission’s narrowing construction; definitions not unconstitutionally vague |
| Vagueness of "advertisement" / words like "advocates, supports, opposition" | Those terms are vague and could chill speech | State: terms are clear in context tied to election-related object (candidate/ballot) | Definition is not unconstitutionally vague when read in context; no limiting construction needed |
| First Amendment — registration/reporting/disclosure for noncandidate committees | Burdens are substantial and statute should reach only groups with primary purpose of political advocacy | State: burdens are modest, threshold $1,000 and purpose-limited (as construed) tie to informational and anti-corruption interests | Survives exacting scrutiny as applied to A-1; requirements substantially related to important interests |
| First Amendment — disclaimer requirement for political ads (HRS § 11-391) | Disclaimers burden content and should be limited to federal electioneering/expression of express advocacy | State: disclaimer is modest, informs electorate who is speaking, prevents confusion | Disclaimer requirement survives exacting scrutiny as applied to A-1 (consistent with Citizens United) |
| Contractor contribution ban (HRS § 11-355) — as applied to contributions to legislators who do not award/oversee contracts | Ban is overbroad as applied when recipient has no role in awarding/overseeing A-1’s contracts | State: ban prevents appearance and risk of quid pro quo corruption across legislature; ban is closely drawn to that interest | Ban survives closely drawn scrutiny even as applied to A-1’s proposed contributions; narrower tailoring not required |
| Standing to challenge electioneering-communication reporting (HRS § 11-341) | A-1 contends post‑complaint statutory amendment subjects it to § 11-341 so it has standing now | State: at filing A-1 was subject to noncandidate committee regime and not subject to § 11-341 reporting; standing assessed at filing | No standing to litigate § 11-341 because standing is assessed at complaint filing; court declined to reach the claim |
| Attorney’s fees for prior interlocutory appeal (Yamada & Stewart) | Plaintiffs seek § 1988 fees for defending interlocutory appeal and later prevailing on the merits | Defendants/ district court: no authority to award appellate fees because prevailing-party status arose later and fee request should have been filed under Circuit Rule | District court erred in refusing to consider fees for the earlier appeal; plaintiffs entitled to appellate-fee consideration; referred to Appellate Commissioner to set amount |
Key Cases Cited
- Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (construed "for the purpose of influencing" to apply to express advocacy)
- Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (upheld disclosure/disclaimer requirements for corporate political speech)
- Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449 (2007) (functional-equivalent test for express advocacy)
- McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) (upheld broad "promote/oppose" language against vagueness challenge)
- Human Life of Wash. v. Brumsickle, 624 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2010) (upheld materially similar political-committee disclosure regime)
- McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014) (discussed standards for contribution limits and anti-corruption interests)
- Green Party of Connecticut v. Garfield, 616 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 2010) (upheld contractor contribution ban under closely drawn scrutiny)