Jimenez v. McGeary
542 S.W.3d 810
Tex. App.2018Background
- MetLife foreclosed on the Jimenezes' home in Aug. 2010; FNMA acquired title and later sought possession; earlier forcible-detainer proceedings resulted in FNMA obtaining possession, and the Jimenezes' appeal was affirmed.
- While that appeal was pending, FNMA sold the property to David McGeary and his son in June 2016; McGeary demanded possession in Aug. 2016 after the Jimenezes refused to leave.
- McGeary filed a forcible-detainer action in justice court, obtained an eviction order, and the Jimenezes appealed to county court; after a trial de novo the county court awarded possession to McGeary.
- The Jimenezes raised four appellate issues: (1) trial court’s failure to file requested findings/conclusions; (2) improper verification of McGeary’s petition by his attorney; (3) failure to join McGeary’s co-owner son and insufficiency of notices to vacate; (4) insufficiency of evidence to show tenancy at sufferance and lack of privity.
- The record included a special warranty deed showing McGeary (and his son) as grantees and notices to vacate addressed on behalf of "David McGeary."
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Trial court failed to file findings/conclusions after timely request | Jimenez: Requested findings under Tex. R. Civ. P. 296; court did not file them | McGeary: Jimenezes failed to file the required notice of past-due findings under Rule 297 | Waived — failure to file notice of past-due findings forfeits appellate complaint; issue overruled |
| 2. Petition verification invalid because attorney, not McGeary, swore to it | Jimenez: Rule 510.3(a) requires plaintiff to swear; attorney verification renders pleading invalid and deprives court of jurisdiction | McGeary: Attorney acted as plaintiff’s agent; precedent allows attorney verification; even defective verification does not deprive court of jurisdiction | Overruled — attorney verification valid as agent; alternative ground that defective verification would not divest jurisdiction |
| 3a. Failure to join McGeary’s son as indispensable party | Jimenez: Son is co-owner and indispensable for just adjudication; his absence deprives court of jurisdiction | McGeary: Forcible-detainer determines superior right to immediate possession between parties before court; son not indispensable | Overruled — son not indispensable; absence does not render judgment void |
| 3b. Notices to vacate were insufficient because not on behalf of both owners | Jimenez: Notices were sent on son’s behalf, not McGeary’s, therefore invalid under Property Code | McGeary: Deed and testimony show McGeary as grantee and notices were sent on his behalf | Overruled — evidence showed notices were on behalf of David McGeary |
| 4. Insufficient proof of tenancy at sufferance / lack of privity prevents reliance on security instrument | Jimenez: McGeary didn't introduce the security agreement and lacks privity, so cannot rely on tenancy-at-sufferance clause | McGeary: Title evidence plus post-demand retention establishes tenancy at sufferance; no contract required to be subject to forcible-detainer | Overruled — special warranty deed and refusal to vacate after notice established tenancy at sufferance and superior right to immediate possession |
Key Cases Cited
- Browning v. Placke, 698 S.W.2d 362 (Tex. 1985) (failure to join an "indispensable" party rarely deprives court of jurisdiction)
- Norvelle v. PNC Mortg., 472 S.W.3d 444 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2015) (attorney may verify eviction petition as agent; rule 510.3 construed with other eviction rules)
- Rice v. Pinney, 51 S.W.3d 705 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001) (plaintiff need only show sufficient evidence of ownership to demonstrate superior right to immediate possession in forcible-detainer)
- Williams v. Bank of New York Mellon, 315 S.W.3d 925 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010) (forcible-detainer addresses right to immediate possession, not title)
- ICM Mortg. Corp. v. Jacob, 902 S.W.2d 527 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1994) (tenancy at sufferance arises from wrongful continuation in possession after right ends)
