Jimenez v. Conrad, 678 F.3d 44

In 1982, Jimenez was convicted in Massachusetts of the parolable offense of second-degree murder for killing a police officer, while being acquitted of first-degree murder.
Jimenez applied for parole in 1999, 2004, and 2009, which the Massachusetts Parole Board denied each time.
Jimenez brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging federal due process and equal protection violations and pendant state claims.
The district court dismissed the federal claims under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, and acknowledged that § 1983 cannot enjoin judicial officers.
On de novo review, the First Circuit affirmed dismissal of all federal claims for lack of plausibility and entitlement to relief.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does the Massachusetts parole statute create a substantive entitlement to parole under due process?	Jimenez asserts a due process entitlement to serious parole consideration.	Board is discretionary; statute does not create a guaranteed parole entitlement.	No due process entitlement; statute is not an entitlement.
Is there an equal protection violation based on alleged pretextual reasoning related to the victim being a police officer?	Board treated Jimenez more harshly due to victim's police officer status; pretext alleged.	Discretion allows consideration of law enforcement factors; pretext evidence insufficient.	Complaint fails to show equal protection violation; pretext alone insufficient.
Did a prior unsuccessful new-trial petition and related comments constitute unlawful punitive reasoning binding due process?	Comment about new-trial petition shows improper retaliation or punishing guilt posture.	Comment reflects a reasonable consideration of confrontation with facts and responsibility.	No due process violation; comments fall within permissible administrative consideration.
Does the complaint state a plausible equal protection claim by alleging categorically worse treatment due to victim type?	Allegations show atypical discrimination against officer-victim cases.	Rational basis supports greater deterrence for harming officers; no unconstitutional classification.	No equal protection violation; rational basis supports the policy.

Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979) (parole eligibility requires a substantive entitlement for due process claim)
Lanier v. Mass. Parole Bd., 396 Mass. 1018, 489 N.E.2d 670 (1986) (parole statutes may create no entitlement when language is negative)
Esso Standard Oil Co. v. López-Freytes, 522 F.3d 136 (1st Cir. 2008) (due process standards for administrative action against a party)
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998) (substantive due process requires not be arbitrary or shocking in concrete context)
Iverson v. City of Boston, 452 F.3d 94 (1st Cir. 2006) (preservation and articulation of constitutional claims in district court)
Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969) (retaliatory increased punishment after retrial; limits on punitive use of new trials)
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (pleading standards require plausibility, not mere possibility)
Toledo v. Sánchez, 454 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2006) (context of parole and deterrence considerations for officers or similar roles)
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969) (retaliatory sentencing after conviction and retrial concerns)
Worcester v. Comm'r, 370 F.2d 713 (1st Cir. 1966) (administrative decisions and treatment of claims in appellate context)