907 F.3d 701
3rd Cir.2018Background
- In 2005 a Cessna 172N with a Lycoming O-320-D2C engine crashed after takeoff; pilot David Sikkelee died. Plaintiff (his wife) sued Lycoming alleging a design defect in the engine’s Marvel‑Schebler MA‑4SPA carburetor (bolts loosened, fuel leaked, engine lost power).
- Lycoming received a type certificate for the engine in 1966; the certificate originally allowed use of safety wire but the FAA later permitted Lycoming to substitute hex bolts with lock-tab washers via a DER‑approved change. Service bulletins and FAA correspondence over decades recorded reports of loose carburetor bolts and urged Lycoming to address the problem.
- The carburetor in the accident aircraft had been overhauled in 2004 by Kelly (a PMA holder/repair station) using parts and procedures consistent with Lycoming/Precision service guidance; the carburetor design remained substantially the same.
- Procedural history: District Court initially granted judgment on the pleadings based on field preemption; this Court (Sikkelee II) rejected categorical field preemption and remanded to consider conflict preemption. On remand the District Court found conflict preemption and granted summary judgment for Lycoming; it also granted summary judgment for Lycoming on a separate claim under 14 C.F.R. § 21.3 for failure to notify the FAA. Plaintiff appealed.
- On review the Third Circuit held Lycoming failed to meet the burden for impossibility preemption because it did not show “clear evidence” the FAA would have refused the design change; the court reversed the grant of summary judgment on preemption and on state‑law strict liability and negligence claims (finding genuine factual disputes), but affirmed summary judgment for Lycoming on the § 21.3 failure‑to‑notify claim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether state tort claims are conflict‑preempted (impossibility) | Sikkelee: FAA approval processes do not bar liability; Lycoming could have implemented design changes (or DER approval would suffice) and there is no clear evidence FAA would have rejected changes. | Lycoming: Type certificate and FAA rules prevent unilateral design changes; compliance with state law would have been impossible without FAA approval, so conflict preemption applies. | Not preempted — Third Circuit: Lycoming failed to show clear evidence FAA would have denied a change; Wyeth standard applies, so plaintiff's claims survive preemption challenge. |
| Whether Lycoming entitled to summary judgment on state‑law strict liability and negligence | Sikkelee: Design defect, knowledge of problem, foreseeable continuation, causation; Lycoming may be liable for component/aftermarket parts when certificated holder sits atop distribution chain. | Lycoming: No causation, substantial change/foreseeability issues, and not in chain of distribution for overhauled carburetor. | Claims survive — genuine disputes of material fact on defect, causation, foreseeability; summary judgment improperly granted. |
| Whether Lycoming violated 14 C.F.R. § 21.3 by failing to report defects to FAA | Sikkelee: Lycoming failed to report known failures/malfunctions and FAA would have acted to correct hazard. | Lycoming: Either complied or no actionable federal‑law basis for a state tort claim. | No liability — affirmed: federal regulatory scheme does not create a private federal standard of care supporting this state‑law negligence claim; summary judgment for Lycoming proper on § 21.3 theory. |
| Role of DERs and whether DER approvals equal FAA approvals for preemption | Sikkelee: DERs are not FAA employees so DER approval cannot substitute for FAA approval for Wyeth clear‑evidence test. | Lycoming: DERs are FAA‑delegated agents; DER approvals constitute FAA approval/part of the approval process. | DERs treated as FAA agents; their delegated approvals count as FAA approval for purposes of the analysis, and DER involvement does not itself defeat preemption analysis. |
Key Cases Cited
- Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009) (brand‑name drug maker may unilaterally strengthen warning under CBE regulation; preemption fails absent clear evidence agency would have rejected change)
- PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604 (2011) (generic drug makers bound to copy brand labeling; impossibility preemption applies where manufacturer cannot independently satisfy state law)
- Mutual Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 570 U.S. 472 (2013) (design‑defect claims against generic drug makers preempted where federal law forbids unilateral design changes)
- Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 822 F.3d 680 (3d Cir. 2016) (prior Third Circuit decision rejecting categorical field preemption of aircraft products‑liability claims)
- Tincher v. Omega Flex, Inc., 104 A.3d 328 (Pa. 2014) (Pennsylvania standards for product defect and consumer‑expectation/risk‑utility tests)