Jill S. Meyer, M.D. v. David J. Shulkin
710 F. App'x 453
2d Cir.2017Background
- Meyer, a psychiatrist, had a mixed-to-negative VA personnel record (1994–2004) documenting poor time management, documentation, and interpersonal skills; she resigned in 2004.
- In January 2009 Meyer applied and was recommended for a psychiatrist position at the Syracuse VA; she received a conditional offer on February 6, 2009 (contingent on suitability review and OPF review).
- After the Syracuse VA obtained Meyer’s Official Personnel Folder (OPF), HR manager Mark Antinelli reviewed it and rescinded the offer on February 24, 2009, citing documented performance and interpersonal problems.
- Meyer filed EEO complaints during her prior NJ VA employment and later alleged Antinelli rescinded the offer in retaliation for that protected activity; she brought a Title VII suit alleging retaliation (age/religion claims were abandoned).
- An administrative law judge and then the district court granted summary judgment for the defendant; the Second Circuit reviewed de novo and affirmed, holding Meyer failed to show a genuine dispute that Antinelli knew of her EEO activity or that retaliation was the but-for cause of the retraction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether summary judgment was proper on Meyer’s Title VII retaliation claim | Meyer: Antinelli learned of her prior EEO complaints from her OPF or via communication and rescinded the offer in retaliation | Government: Antinelli rescinded the offer because the OPF documented poor performance/interpersonal problems; he was not aware of EEO activity | Affirmed: summary judgment for defendant — Meyer failed to meet the de minimis prima facie causation burden; no evidence Antinelli knew of EEO activity or acted in retaliation |
Key Cases Cited
- McElwee v. County of Orange, 700 F.3d 635 (2d Cir. 2012) (standard of review for summary judgment in employment cases)
- Lovejoy-Wilson v. NOCO Motor Fuel, Inc., 263 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 2001) (materiality definition for summary judgment)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (U.S. 1986) (genuine dispute and summary judgment standard)
- Jeffreys v. City of New York, 426 F.3d 549 (2d Cir. 2005) (insufficiency of speculation/conjecture to defeat summary judgment)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (U.S. 1973) (burden-shifting framework for discrimination/retaliation claims)
- Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297 (2d Cir. 2015) (application of McDonnell Douglas framework in Title VII cases)
- Hicks v. Baines, 593 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2010) (elements of prima facie retaliation claim)
- Jute v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 420 F.3d 166 (2d Cir. 2005) (prima facie causation and burden shifting)
- Ya-Chen Chen v. City Univ. of New York, 805 F.3d 59 (2d Cir. 2015) (but-for causation standard post-Nassar)
- Univ. of Tex. Southwestern Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (U.S. 2013) (but-for causation required for retaliation claims)
- Gordon v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 232 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2000) (direct and indirect methods of proving causation)
- Redd v. New York Div. of Parole, 678 F.3d 166 (2d Cir. 2012) (causation as a question of fact)
- Fujitsu Ltd. v. Fed. Express Corp., 247 F.3d 423 (2d Cir. 2001) (unsubstantiated speculation cannot defeat summary judgment)
- Trans Sport, Inc. v. Starter Sportswear, Inc., 964 F.2d 186 (2d Cir. 1992) (conjecture is insufficient to avoid summary judgment)
- Holcomb v. Iona College, 521 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2008) (conclusory allegations insufficient to resist summary judgment)